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ABSTRACT 
 
THREE ESSAYS ON FIRM BEHAVIORS IN ONLINE MARKET PLATFORMS 
SEPTEMBER 2019 
ERFAN REZVANI 
B.S., MAZANDARAN UNIVERISYT OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY 
 
Ph.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST 
 
Directed by: Professors Albert Assaf and Muzzo Uysal 
 
 
Across many online market platforms, customer reviews have become a 
prevailing mechanism to evaluate firms and disseminate information about the quality of 
their products/services. While prior research has well-documented the impact of such 
customer-generated information on firm performance such as sales (e.g. Chevalier & 
Mayzlin 2006, Liu, 2006), understanding how firms react to customer evaluations 
generates an interesting yet an underexplored topic for research. This dissertation, 
through three studies, aims to investigate how customer reviews that are posted on online 
platforms shape how firms learn, communicate, and compete. 
 Chapter 1 shows that learning from own experience follows an inverted U-shaped 
curve. This finding indicates that with increase in own experience, firms face lower 
customer evaluations in the short-run, but in the long-run they eventually improve their 
performance by reducing their customer dissatisfaction. The study also showed that 
learning from accumulated experience of similar firms has a U-shaped relationship with 
customer evaluation, and that the larger the performance gap, the more motivation 
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organizations have to learn in order to stay on par with their competitors in terms of 
performance.  
 
Chapter 2 finds that the proportion of responsive peers (i.e. the extent of peer 
pressure) is correlated with a focal firm’s responsiveness to its customer reviews. The 
extent of responsiveness, in turn, has a positive impact on customer review ratings. 
Moreover, this study finds that firm responsiveness has a weaker effect for branded 
(relative to independent) firms. The study also shows that firms with more experience in 
providing response to customers may observe a stronger positive effect vis-à-vis less 
experienced firms. However, the effect is limited to branded firms which may possess 
better capability to learn from their experience.  
 Chapter 3 shows that, although online reputation (created by online customer 
reviews) can partly explain the price competition among firms with similar reputation, 
the quality and geographical location have more important effect in determining the 
intensity of price competition among firms. This study also finds that price competition is 
highly localized with respect to geographical location and quality.   
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CHAPTER 1 
LEARNING FROM OWN AND OTHERS: THE MODERATING ROLE OF 
CUSTOMER-EVALUATED PERFORMANCE GAP1  
1.1. Introduction 
 
 Learning is fundamental for organizational performance improvement (March, 
1991) and survival (Singh et al., 1986; Baum & Ingram, 1998). Research on 
organizational learning acknowledges the importance of learning from own experience as 
well as the experience of others (e.g. competitors). The relationship between accumulated 
experience and performance (e.g. Wright, 1936; Levy, 1965; Adler & Clark, 1991), is 
contingent upon the source of learning (own vs. others) and the type of learning outcome 
being measured (March, 2010). 
Scholars have emphasized that learning through accumulation of own experience 
depends on several dimensions such as exposure to different types of experience 
(Haunschild & Sullivan, 2002) and the recency of the experience (Argote & Epple, 
1990). Learning from the experience of others depends on the clarity and relatedness (i.e. 
to our own) of the competitor activities (Ingram & Baum, 1997), among other things. 
What affects learning outcomes also depend on the firm’s organizational structure 
(Bunderson & Boumgarden, 2010; Fang et al., 2010), social affiliations and networks 
(Reagans & McEvily, 2003), as well as other external factors surrounding the firm such 
 
1 Please note that an earlier draft of this chapter was published in the International Journal of Hospitality 
Management (Rezvani et al. 2019). 
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as changes in government regulations or technological shifts (Bower & Christensen, 
1996).    
When assessing whether firms learn through experience, one would also need to 
consider the type of performance outcome being measured. While most organizational 
learning studies focused on internal measures of performance such as revenue (Mezias et 
al., 2002), growth (Greve, 2008), and return on assets (Greve, 2003), organizations are 
abstractly recognized and evaluated by relevant actors in markets (DiMaggio & Powell, 
1991). Experts, third party intermediaries, and even customers can evaluate the 
performance of organizations. In the financial sector, analysts provide recommendations 
on stock performance based on their own interpretation of firm performance. In education 
sectors, schools’ rankings, provided by third party organizations, may influence financial 
performance (Pfeffer & Fong, 2004).  
Particular in online markets, customer-generated information acts as a quality 
signal and influences the performance of firms across different industries including 
lodging (Anderson, 2012), movie (Duan et al., 2008), and books’ sale (Chavalier & 
Mayzlin, 2006). As such evaluation mechanisms become prevalent; they can in turn 
mobilize organizational resources to conform to what constitutes the acceptable 
‘performance’ (DeMaggio & Powell, 1983; Smith, 2011). Similarly, this study argues 
that such customer-driven evaluations encourage organizations to learn according to 
customer-based performance and improve in order to stay competitive in markets heavily 
influenced by such mechanism.   
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Despite the notable importance of learning based on external evaluation, research 
addressing organizational learning pattern on external measures is scarce.  In fact, 
scholars have called for more research to relate experience to such performance measures 
(Lapré & Tsikriktsis, 2006; Lapré, 2011).  The current study responds to the call and 
differentiates from the present literature in two ways. First, it investigates learning 
outcomes based on customer dissatisfaction. We also differentiate between two important 
sources of learning: learning from own experience and learning from the experience of 
others. The first refers to how firms learn from their own experience to reduce customer 
dissatisfaction over time, while the latter refers to how firms learn from the experience of 
their close competitors to reduce customer dissatisfaction over time. 
Second, this study examines the impact of the performance gap between own and 
best performing competitors (i.e. performance aspiration) as a motivational factor for 
organizational learning. More specifically, this study attempts to answer the following 
question: Does the magnitude of performance gap affect the learning outcome from both 
own and others’ experience?  As customers seek the best value offerings among their 
choice sets, organizations in turn may set their point of reference to their best competitors 
(Peteraf & Shanley, 1997; Moliterno et al., 2014), compare their own performance with 
them, and set aspirations to learn and improve accordingly.  
The rest of this chapter proceeds as follows: Section 1.2 presents the theoretical 
framework and the hypotheses. Section 3.1 introduces the empirical study (context, data, 
and measurements). Section 1.4 presents the results. Section 1.5 presents the discussion 
and conclusions.   
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1.2. Theoretical Framework and Hypotheses 
1.2.1. Learning from own experience (experiential learning) 
 
 According to the experiential learning theory, performance can improve as firms 
accumulate experience over time at a decreasing rate (Dutton & Thomas, 1984). The 
theory roots back to the Wright learning curve (Wright, 1936) as the foremost learning 
model observed in manufacturing settings in which accumulation of experience was 
shown to reduce the cost in an airplane production facility. At the center of the 
organizational learning process, there exists learning cycles with inherent feedback and 
capability for adaptation (Zangwill & Kantor, 1998). In other words, the necessary 
mechanism for experiential learning involves reflection on available feedback following 
the experience and the conceptualization of a causality link between experience and the 
outcome (March, 2010).  As organizational routines can be interpreted as the result of 
realization of success of previous actions and continuous adaptation to maximize goals 
attainment (Argote, 1999), organizational learning involves an incremental process 
within the established routines that create structure for interpretation of action-outcome 
(Daft & Weick, 1984).  
Many factors related to feedback information can also influence learning. Huber 
(1991) argues that experiential learning is enhanced by the increased availability of 
accurate feedback on actions and outcomes. External evaluation feedback can be very 
abstract, heterogamous in nature and ambiguous. Thus, learning can be impaired from 
such feedback information and become negatively related to the accumulation of 
operating experience. Learning in complex and dynamic environments with too many 
variables make it difficult to conceptualize effective action-outcome causation.  
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Temporal and spatial dis-contiguity between an action or experience and the 
outcome makes the learning from feedback prone to errors. Sorenson (2003) showed that 
difficulties in direct observation of outcome of actions and interruption and lack of 
effective information communication in highly vertically integrated organizations 
negatively affect the learning ability. Repenning & Sterman (2002) showed that time 
delay between an action and its outcome may lead to erroneous interpretation and 
misattribution of an action’s outcome. Starbuck & Milliken (1988) argue that 
retrospective account of past actions oversimplifies and erase many casual relationships 
between an action and outcome and may not help organizational decision making in 
current time by ‘sense-making’ of past events.  
Noise and ambiguity in the environment can lead to “superstitious learning” by 
learning false lessons by misattributing unrelated consequences to organizational actions 
(Argyris & Schön, 1978; Levitt & March, 1988). Ambiguity refers to the presence of 
contradictory feedback regarding an action. Zollo & Winter (2002) posit that high level 
of perceived ambiguity between actions and outcomes decreases the likelihood of 
learning from experience in reaction to a dynamic environment.  
In addition, often, feedback is distorted and noisy, not revealing the true 
relationship between actions and outcomes that  is necessary for an effective learning 
(Huber, 1982).  According to Levitt & March (1988) and Levinthal & March (1993), 
organizational learning is impaired when the perception about action-outcome feedback 
is poorly specified and might lead to erroneous learning. Also, March & Olsen (1975) 
discussed that individuals create false belief, or “myth”, based on subjective 
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interpretation of inaccurate information and transfer of their knowledge within 
organizations.  
Acknowledging that the ability to draw accurate causation from feedback 
information depends on how it is related to current routines which are based on known 
casual relationships (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990), the process of learning from a dynamic 
and complex environment requires a series of cause-effect relationships assessments to 
develop a theory (know-why) that explains the experienced events and their performance 
implications (Mukherjee et al., 1998). During this search process, the risk of 
misattribution and creation of erroneous ‘mid-theories’ may have disruptive impact on 
the current performance. Heleblian & Finkelstein (1999) found that heterogeneity 
involved in the previous experience and difficulty of developing an effective cause-effect 
relationship in the short-run, results in lower performance in organizations.  
However, the rate of discovery is enhanced with an increase in search intensity 
and richness of information pool (Radner, 1975). In other words, with further 
accumulation of experience that are similar in nature, accompanied by increased 
likelihood of observing similar feedback, the likelihood of discovering a ‘correct’ theory’ 
increases. That, in turn, increases the chance of establishing incremental change into 
current routines with higher possibility of enhancing performance. Therefore, this study 
hypothesizes:  
H1: The level of own experience has an inverted U-shaped relationship with 
customer dissatisfaction; In the short-run customer dissatisfaction will increase, but as 
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firms accumulate further experience in the long-run, customer dissatisfaction will 
decrease.   
1.2.2. Learning from others’ experience (vicarious learning)  
 
 Competitive environment was found to influence the learning outcomes for 
organizations. Spence (1981) showed that with increase in market competition with large 
number of competitors, the incentive for learning increases for individual firms as source 
of competitive advantage, but he posits that in the presence of knowledge spill-over 
effect, learning motivation based on own experience decreases. The pursuit of profit 
maximization and risk aversion drives organizations to evaluate the cost and benefit 
related to a learning process. In that sense, realization of a known causal relationship in 
the environment (market) does not justify the cost of learning by self. In fact, Rendell et 
al. (2010) showed that, although own experiential learning provides more accurate 
information about a task, social learning (vicarious or learning from others) through 
observing and exploiting others’ successful strategies has higher pay-off even under the 
condition in which experiential learning costs no more than vicarious learning, because of 
information filtration benefit associated with highly paid-off strategies. In other words, 
social learners can lower the risk associated with trial-error learning and save the cost of 
searching for successful strategies according to their own experience (Smith, 1988; 
Laland, 2004). Similarly, March (1991) also argued that the existence of obvious pay-offs 
from strategies limits organizational effort to explore new ones by themselves. 
Empirical evidence on the benefit of vicarious learning for competing firms is 
present in the literature. In studying the impact of the sources of experience on learning 
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curves for U.S. railroad organizations, Baum & Dahlin (2007) found that in order to 
reduce their accident costs, railroad organizations benefit more from the experience of 
other similar organizations than from their own experience. Similarly, using time-series 
data from 1,135 hotel chains from 1896 to 1985, Ingram & Baum (1997) found that while 
own operating experience benefit organizations in the short-run, it had a negative effect 
in the long-run because of the overreliance on own knowledge and inertia created through 
exploiting current routines. The authors found that industry operation and competitive 
experience consistently motivated hotels to succeed.  
Cohen & Levinthal (1990) argue that excessive reliance on knowledge acquisition 
from others can also be dysfunctional for organizations. To realize its benefits, the 
experience from others must be absorbed and integrated into the current organizational 
knowledge (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990; Kogut & Zander, 1992). Thus, exploitation of 
such external experience is limited to the extent to which an organization can integrate 
the knowledge into its own current knowledge. As a result, the benefit of such 
exploitation becomes smaller as the need for knowledge integration increases. 
Furthermore, a high level of integration introduces a greater level of variability to current 
routines (knowledge) and imposes disruption to own knowledge due to the increasing 
need to modify the importing experience in accordance to current knowledge (Dodgson, 
1993; Kim, 1998). Particularly, due to limited absorptive capacity for external knowledge 
acquisition (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990), the effective integration of external knowledge 
becomes more costly as the amount of available external experience increases.  
Therefore, lower levels of accumulated experience from others, due to higher 
levels of available absorptive capacity, increases learning ability and provides adaptive 
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benefits. As external knowledge absorption increases, the disruptive effect outweighs the 
benefit of adaptation at a higher rate because of decreasing capacity for absorption and 
increasing disturbance to the current knowledge. Based on these arguments, this study 
hypothesizes the following: 
H2: The level of external experience (experience from others) has a U-shaped 
relationship with customer dissatisfaction; in the short-run customer dissatisfaction 
decreases by exploiting external experience, but in the long-run,  further dependence on 
external experience has a negative impact on customer dissatisfaction. 
1.2.1. Performance gap as a motivational factor for learning 
 
 Aspiration-performance feedback plays a motivating role in organizational 
learning and change (March & Shapira, 1992; Greve, 2003). As individuals compare 
themselves with similar others for the purpose of self-assessment or self-enhancement 
(Wood, 1989), in a competitive business context, organizations also form aspiration 
levels for performance improvement by comparing their performance relative to that of 
similar organizations representing their reference groups (Cyert & March, 1963). Greve 
(2003) showed that decision makers’ learning pattern differs with managers’ evaluation 
of current performance relative to “aspiration level”. Duncan (1979) posit that persistent 
performance gap in performance indicates lack of knowledge and motivates organization 
to obtain knowledge through searching/exploring. The extent of performance gap 
determines the intensity of search efforts to reduce the gap (March & Simon, 1958). 
 Resorting to exploratory search for solution involves risk even with higher 
expected pay-off than exploitation of own knowledge (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). 
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Underperformance also decreases the risk tolerance of the investment for exploration 
(McNamara & Bromiley, 1997). Similarly, Greve (2003) argues that performing near 
aspiration level initiates more local-search and exploitation of the current knowledge 
within organization, while larger performance gap triggers non-local and more 
exploratory search for new practices (Greve, 2003). In other words, learning from own 
experience is deemphasized in favor of exploring and learning from others’ experience 
(Baum & Dahlin, 2007).  
In addition, as emphasized earlier, utilizing customer feedback to reflect on own 
experience requires a continuous course of trial and error. The realization of an actual 
pay-off may be uncertain, at least in the short-run. Such uncertainty decreases the 
propensity of utilizing such feedback in favor of exploiting current own knowledge, even 
with lower pay-offs. That implies that firms benefit from their own experiential learning 
with a relatively lower benefit rate of learning. That is because of the longer learning time 
required to learn from own experience and also a higher relative value of learning from 
the experience of others available within the market. Thus, this study hypothesizes:   
H3a: The performance gap flattens (reduces) the inverted U-shaped relationship 
between learning from own experience and customer dissatisfaction. In other words, the 
negative effect of lower levels of own experience on performance as well as the positive 
effect of higher levels of own experience are reduced with an increase in performance 
gap.  
Similarly, when the performance gap increases, motivation to use experience from 
others also increases. That is, a higher gap between own and a competitor’s performance 
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may deemphasize the reliance on own experience. In other words, a larger extent of 
underperformance (increased performance gap) can lower the resistance to change and 
import experience from others as a learning source. While this learning mechanism may 
benefit underperforming firms to some extent, firms may incur a higher risk of 
successfully implementing the outside experience when they become abundant and the 
need for absorbing and integrating the external experience increases. The risk is 
attributable to a relative lack of reliance on own knowledge necessary to absorb the 
external experience (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990; Zahra & George, 2002). Accordingly, this 
study hypothesizes: 
H3b: The performance gap steepens the U-shaped relationship between learning 
from the experience of others and customer dissatisfaction. In other words, the negative 
effect of lower levels of experience from others on customer dissatisfaction as well as the 
positive effect of high levels of experience of others become stronger as the performance 
gap increases.  
 
H2 
Own experience  
Experience 
from others 
Customer 
Dissatisfaction  
Performance gap  
H3b 
 
Figure 1 Conceptual Framework 
H1 H3a 
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1.3. Empirical study  
1.3.1. Research Context and Data 
 
 Figure 1 summarizes the conceptual framework and the hypotheses discussed 
above. This study utilizes a single market of hotels to control for the complexity impact 
that can affect the knowledge creation within an organization. Hotels are characterized as 
rather simple organizations and less knowledge intensive compared to manufacturing or 
high-tech organizations. In addition, considering only a single market in a specific 
geographical area enables the study to assume that organizations can observe and learn 
from their competitors’ practices. Also, geographical proximity can be a facilitating 
factor for knowledge spill-over effect. The sample encompasses hotels of different 
service quality categories. Categorization of hotels is based on their average room price 
level; this is the primary method used by Smith Travel Research, one of the leading 
global hotel information providers (Kalnins & Chung, 2004; McCann & Vroom, 2010). 
Hotels in the sample include 5 categories from 1 to 5; with 5 indicating the highest 
quality (price) level.  
This study uses 241,512 online customer reviews from Tripadvisor and their 
ratings for 61 hotels in Manhattan, New York within a period of 30 months (From 
January 2013 to June 2015). Monthly panel data, for the purpose of this study, is used to 
observe the performance of the hotels over time. New York City also represents a very 
competitive market for hotels across variety of hotel classes and year-round demand for 
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this location. The sample also includes hotels with various sizes as well as both 
independent and chain hotels.  
This study uses online customer reviews as an external performance measure. 
While  Greve (2008) discussed that organizations pursue a variety of goals and set 
different aspirations that shape their behaviors, previous research on organizational 
learning and performance aspiration attend mainly to profitability measures such as 
return on assets  (Audia et al., 2000; Greve, 2003). Focusing on overall performance 
leaves out sufficient explanation regarding sub-goals within organizations (Gavetti et al., 
2012). Only a few studies have included other variables such as accident cost (Baum & 
Dahlin, 2007), market share and social status of organizations in a competitive network 
(Baum et al., 2005).  In the same line, this study also examines a non-financial measure 
of performance.  It argues that assessing and enhancing performance evaluated through 
online media such as Tripadvisor can form an intermediate performance aspiration 
because such indicator directly influences potential customers purchase decision and 
consequently impact hotel sales (Chen et al., 2004 ; Lu et al. , 2014). Further, social 
media such as TripAdvisor involves an open and accessible source of information to 
monitor competitors’ performance. 
To test the proposed hypotheses, similar to learning curve models, this study 
builds a regression model to link the experience variables to the performance variable.  
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Table 1 Description of the main variables 
 
Variable  Description 
Performance (DV) (Number of “terrible” and “poor” rated reviews/ the number of total 
reviews received at time t ) * Hotel size 
Own Experience (IV) Accumulated number of reviews received at time t-1 
Experience of Others (IV) Accumulated number of reviews received for hotels within the same 
group (the star-level) at time t-1 
Performance Gap(moderator) The difference between own performance and the best rival’s 
performance (within the same group) at time t-1 
 
1.3.2. Dependent variable (Performance) 
 
 This study measures performance using the degree of customer dissatisfaction 
(the proportion of negative reviews (including ‘poor’ and ‘terrible’ ratings) to the total 
number of reviews for each hotel during a period of a month)2. Although other reviews 
may also contain some negativity and complaining voice, these two specific groups of 
review are the most indicative measures of overall customer complaints and 
dissatisfaction.  
  All data were obtained from TripAdvisor, which seems to be an appropriate 
choice based on the purpose of this study. Negative reviews represent a genuine source of 
information on dissatisfactory performance for hoteliers. Hotel managers can utilize this 
information and easily monitor both their own and their competitors’ performance.  
1.3.3. Independent variables (Own and Others’ Experience) 
 
 The variable experience (both from own and others) is measured by accounting 
for cumulative number of total reviews that hotels receive from customers. Since it is 
unlikely that customers post multiple reviews on a single hotel stay, the number of posted 
 
2  This measure is adjusted this proportion for the number of hotel rooms. 
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reviews on TripAdvisor can be used as a proxy of sale (i.e. number of rooms sold). 
Similar operationalization was used in other studies in which hotel reviews were used as 
a proxy of sale (Ye et al, 2011; Ye et al., 2009). In the same fashion, this study uses the 
accumulation of prior reviews on hotels within the same quality level to measure the 
experience from others. 
1.3.4. Moderator (Performance gap) and control variables 
 
 This study measures the aspiration level (performance gap) as the difference 
between a hotel’s own and its best competitor’s performance. Usually, hotels within each 
class compete with each other. By monitoring its competitors’ ratings based on customer 
reviews, a hotel can compare and consequently realize the possible gap. For the purpose 
of the current study, the gap between a hotel’s failure rate and the best performing hotel 
within its peer group represents the performance gap measure. 
Due to inherent seasonality in the travel industry, this study introduces dummy 
variables for four quarters to control for variation in sales. By including dummy variables 
for each hotel, the impact of fixed unobserved heterogeneity among hotels was 
controlled. This study also controlled for ownership type (chain versus independent 
hotels) as a possible factor that may impact the failure rate.  
1.3.5. Data Analysis 
 
 This study uses panel (cross-sectional time-series) data. As Lant (1992) 
mentioned, pooling cross-sectional time-series data creates three estimation problems: 
heteroscedasticity, contemporaneous correlation, and autocorrelation. It is expected to 
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observe autocorrelation (typical in learning curve studies), cross-sectional correlation 
(because data were obtained from hotels within the same geographical market), and 
heteroscedasticity (because the variance in the error terms may be related to each specific 
hotel). Hence, consistent with the estimation procedure used in Lapré & Tsikriktsis 
(2006), all estimations were corrected for panel specific autocorrelation using first-order 
autoregressive specification and standard error terms as well as cross-sectional 
correlation using the procedure “xtpsce” in STATA.   
 The three main models (model 1, 4, and 5) were constructed in a step-wise 
fashion3. This study first includes control variables in model (1). The second model (4) 
includes the main independent variables (both own and others’ experience) with one lag 
to account the impact of past experience on the measure of performance. In model (5), 
the moderator variable (performance gap) and the interaction terms were added to test 
whether performance gap has significant effects on the shape of learning curves based on 
both types of experience (from own and others). Hence, Model 5 represents the full 
model this study is trying to test. 
This study also considered the possibility that the learning curve might be a 
function of calendar time as an alternative proxy for the experience variable (Hora & 
Klassen, 2013; Lapre et al. 2000). However, the results did not show support for such an 
alternative model. Additionally, a two-way fixed effect model was used by including 
month dummies (29 dummies for 30 months under study) in model (3) to test for any 
 
3 While the purpose of the study is based on the simultaneous learning patterns both from own and others’ 
experience, Models 2 and 3 were built to measure the impact of each experience variable separately. 
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unobserved time variant variables affecting the learning curve; however, the shapes of 
learning curves for both own and experience from others remain unchanged.   
1.4. Results 
 
 Table 2 reports the descriptive statistics of all variables including the mean, 
standards deviation, and correlations. Table 3 contains the regression results. The results 
(Table 3) show that the effect of own experience on customer dissatisfaction is positive 
and significant, and the effect of its squared term is negative and significant. Such results 
are consistent across Models 3, 4 and 5. These results seem to strongly support 
Hypothesis 1 predicting that the accumulation of own experience and customer 
dissatisfaction have an inverted U-shaped relationship4. While the effect of experience 
from others seem to be inconsistent between Models 2, 4 and 5 , the results should be 
based on the full theoretical model (i.e. Model 5) in which a sign of U-shaped 
relationship between experience of others and customer dissatisfaction is observed. 
However, this study cannot fully claim a U-shaped relationship within the range of data 
(see footnote 3).  
Table 2 Means, Standard Deviations and Correlations 
 
 variables Mean S.D. 1 2 3 4 
1 Failure rate 45.83 117.45 1    
2 Own Experience 583.53 590.65 0.25 1   
3 Experience from Others 8231.69 7970.06 -0.04 0.70 1  
4 Performance gap 0.09 0.13 0.44 -0.07 -0.21 1 
 
 
4 This study also tested for both inverted and U-shaped relationships using the three steps approach as 
recommended by Haans et al. (2016).  The turning point for the inverted U-shape is well within the data 
range and the slopes at the low and high end of the X-range are also significant. The results however failed 
to completely support the full U-shaped relationship between the experience from others and customer 
dissatisfaction.  
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Hypothesis 3a predicts that with an increase in performance gap, the inverted U-
shaped relationship between customer dissatisfaction and own experience will be 
reduced. In Model 5 (Table 3), the coefficient of the interaction between own experience 
and performance gap is negative and non-significant. Also, the interaction between 
performance gap and the squared term of “experience from others” is not significant. 
Thus, the moderating effect of performance gap on the effect of own experience on 
customer dissatisfaction is not supported. However, Hypothesis 3b predicting the 
moderating effect of the performance gap on learning from others is supported. The 
interaction of performance gap and the squared term of the “experience from others” is 
positive and significant indicating that the relationship is moderated by the performance 
gap. However, given that the results did not fully support a U-shaped relationship, this 
study cannot fully support a flattening moderation here.   
Table 3 The effects of own and others experience on learning 
 
   Models 
Variables (1) (2)      (3)     (4) (5) 
Constant -34.895*** 
(9.565) 
11.356*** 
(2.150) 
10.764*** 
(2.444) 
11.304*** 
(2.518) 
11.111*** 
(2.668) 
Controls      
Season 1 -5.077** 
(2.170) 
-3.956** 
(1.879) 
-2.613 
(2.206) 
-3.421∗ 
(2.017) 
-3.331 
(2.031) 
Season 2 -0.607 
(2.201) 
-0.172 
(1.857) 
1.147 
(2.213) 
0.083 
(2.032) 
0.123 
(2.059) 
Season 3 -2.160 
(2.365) 
-1.477 
(1.974) 
-1.083 
(2.312) 
-1.447 
(2.101) 
-1.538 
(2.113) 
Chain affiliation 49.775*** 
(9.383) 
  48.117*** 
   (8.164) 
 
46.715*** 
(8.321) 
29.553*** 
(4.942) 
30.054*** 
(4.591) 
Quality level 3 134.632*** 
(12.122) 
-56.489*** 
(7.981) 
-52.697***   
(8.578) 
-34.583*** 
(5.655) 
-35.042*** 
(5.340) 
Quality level 4 37.510*** 
(9.415) 
-7.971 
(11.625) 
-0.501 
(11.338) 
17.215* 
(8.682) 
17.831* 
(8.294) 
Quality level 5 37.260** 
(9.436) 
-8.866** 
(2.601) 
-7.043** 
(2.679) 
-11.851*** 
(2.731) 
-11.708*** 
(2.756) 
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Predictors      
Performance Gap 
(lag) 
 15.563 
(14.296) 
 9.842 
(14.206) 
9.597 
(14.295) 
1.555 
(14.929) 
Own Experience 
(lag) 
  0.010*** 
(0.002) 
0.020*** 
(0.005) 
0.019** 
(0.005) 
Own Experience2 
(lag) 
  -1.2×10−5*   
(5.7×10−6) 
     -1.8×10−5** 
     (6.9×10−6) 
-1.8×10−5** 
(6.9×10−6) 
Experience from 
Others (lag) 
 3.9×10−4**
* 
(1.1×10−4) 
     -7.1×10−4* 
     (2.7×10−4) 
-6.5×10−4* 
(2.7×10−4) 
 Experience from Others
2
 
(lag) 
 -5.0×10−9 
(1.6×10−8) 
     6.0×10−8** 
    (2.0×10−8) 
6.3×10−8** 
(1.9×10−8) 
Interactions      
Own experience 
(lag) X 
performance gap 
(lag) 
    -0.141 
(0.135) 
Own Experience2 (
lag)X performance 
gap (lag) 
    9.0×10−6 
(1.2×10−4) 
Experience from 
Others (lag) X  
performance gap 
(lag) 
    0.008 
(0.005) 
 Experience from Others2 
(lag)X 
performance gap 
(lag) 
    5.33×10−7" 
(3.0×10−7) 
Hotels fixed effect yes yes yes yes yes 
Wald χ2 1.2×106 1.2×107 2.3×106 1.1×106 2.6×106 
 R2 0.73 0.75 0.77 0.78 0.79 
N×T 1529 1478 1478 1478 1478 
Note: Dependent variable: Failure rate. Panel corrected standard errors are included in the parentheses. 
‘***’ P<0.001; ‘**’ P<0.01; ‘*’P< 0.05; ‘"’P< 0.1 
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1.5. Discussions and Contributions  
 
 Following the calls by Argote (1999) and Lapre & Tsikriktsis (2006) for further 
research on organizational learning curve with focus of market generated measures, 
findings of this study contribute to the current literature on organization learning by 
including online customer evaluation generated through customer reviews of firms (and 
products/services) as an outcome of organizational learning. This study is also motivated 
by the practical importance of examining the learning behavior for service firms. Unlike 
most research on organizational learning traditionally focused on manufacturing context, 
this study focuses on customer feedback as a performance measure for service firms due 
to well-documented impacts on bottom-line performance of such firms. According to 
Levinthal & March (1993), firms may increase their reliability (reducing variability in 
their performance) by repeating certain tasks and accumulating their operating 
experience; however, reliability alone does not guarantee success for firms in competitive 
markets. Also, as needs and expectations change rapidly, hotel managers should be 
sensitive to the voice of their customers and their feedback generated through online 
platforms. Therefore, the role of experience in learning needs to be re-examined. 
Within this context, this study hypothesized and found evidence for two learning 
patterns: learning form own and others’ experience. First, the results showed that learning 
from own experience follows an inverted U-shaped curve. This finding indicates that 
with increase in own experience, organizations face higher customer dissatisfaction in the 
short-run, but in the long-run they eventually improve their performance by reducing 
their customer dissatisfaction. This finding contradicts the study conducted on US 
airlines, in which the authors found a U-shaped learning curve for airline customer 
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dissatisfaction (Lapré & Tsikriktsis, 2006). One possible explanation is that, unlike 
airlines, hotel businesses may involve more customer interactions and receive various 
types of complaints, which may prove not to be easily interpretable.  Hence, the learning 
part (improvement phase) of the curve may occur with some time lag. This study 
accounts for a possible mechanism responsible for such pattern in learning: as firms 
begin a process of learning from customer feedback, noisy, untimely, and unclear 
customer reviews may lead to erroneous learning in the short-run; however, the long-run 
outcome may become positive as firm accumulate further experience to apply ‘correct’ 
actions in order to improve customer satisfaction.     
Second, this study showed that learning from accumulated experience of similar 
organizations may have a U-shaped relationship with customer dissatisfaction. The 
current study accounts for two possible mechanisms that may explain such curvilinear 
relationships in learning from other competitors in the market. First, firms may benefit 
from adaptation to the market (i.e. experience from others) by utilizing current successful 
practices. However, organizations usually manifest limited ability to absorb external 
experience which is needed to apply and integrate such experience into their own 
organization (Lane & Lubatkin, 1998). Second, a disruptive mechanism dominates such 
beneficial learning. With further increases in external experience (i.e. experience from 
others) and dominantly resorting to it as a source of learning, both the interpretability and 
ability to integrate the external experience into a firm’s own knowledge will be impaired 
(Haleblian & Finkelstein, 1999; Zollo & Singh, 2004). In addition, external experience 
becomes a dysfunctional learning practice which interferes with current knowledge 
within an organization.    
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As previous research suggests, both internal and external contextual factors can 
have impact on learning. In fact, Argote & Miron-Spektor (2011) called for research on 
the impact of contextual elements moderating organizational learning. This study is of the 
few that combine a contextual factor, in this case performance gap relative to the best 
competitor, with two types of experience in studying organizational learning curves. 
Many studies have shed light on the impact of customer evaluations on firm performance 
(e.g. Chavalier & Mayzlin, 2006; Duan et al., 2008; Anderson, 2012), however, the 
motivational impact for gaining favorable customer evaluations on learning patterns has 
not received enough attention in the literature.  
This study found potential evidence of the existence of a motivational factor for 
learning in a competitive market. The magnitude of the performance gap shows both 
advantages and disadvantages of learning from similar organizations. In other words, the 
larger the gap, the more motivation organizations have to stay on par with their 
competitors in terms of performance. This conjecture is consistent with findings from the 
study of learning behavior in railroad companies (Baum & Dahlin, 2007). The authors 
found that companies tend to rely on the experience of similar firms when their 
performance is well below other companies.  
However, the hypothesis predicting the moderating effect of performance gap on 
own experiential learning did not confirm that larger performance gap generates more 
motivation to learn from own experience. Social comparison at the inter-organizational 
level may influence the learning orientation in terms of cost-benefit evaluation for 
different sources of learning. Therefore, the impact of larger gap, in this case, does not 
seem to be systematically encouraging the learning process within organizations. A 
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possible explanation for such result may be that learning from own experience may be 
more of an internal process driven by organizational factors that systematically facilitate 
the knowledge interpretation and integration within an organization. Learning based on 
customer feedback may represent an unsystematic process that requires a built-in process 
of interpretation, internationalization, and implementation of knowledge throughout an 
organization (Crossan et al., 1999). Building such a required process may in turn need 
internal motivational factors such as a reward system for knowledge sharing (Bartol & 
Sirivastva, 2002) and motivational leadership to stimulate internal learning (Vera & 
Corssan, 2004). 
According to Levinthal & March (1993), firms may increase their reliability 
(reducing variability in their performance) by repeating certain tasks and accumulating 
experience; however, reliability alone does not guarantee success for firms in competitive 
markets. Customers’ needs and expectations change rapidly, and hotel managers should 
be sensitive to the voice of their customers. Therefore, the role of experience in learning 
needs to be reexamined. This study suggests that organizations that face fierce 
competition with low experience may enjoy more benefits by utilizing the experience 
from others and knowledge available in their competitive market instead of learning to 
improve on their own through a trial-error processes. However, over-reliance on the 
experience of others may inhibit organizations from building their own competencies, 
which in the long-term may jeopardize their performance due to a lack of reliance on 
embedded knowledge in their organizations.  
Practically speaking, hotels need to rely on their own experience as a source of 
learning for long-term benefits. That is because hotels may have more control over their 
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own learning experience and know-how over time and use that accumulated own 
experience as an asset to differentiate themselves from others. In other words, although, 
learning from others could direct hotels to meet critical performance factors in order to be 
competitive, it may not give hotels enough differentiation leverage to sustain their 
performance over time.    
To this end, turning what is learned from the complex environment into an asset 
of operant resources reflective of customer feedback may require the establishment of a 
series of cause-effect relationships between the internal and external firm environments. 
Therefore, hotels own operand resources could be augmented through what is also 
learned from others to propel performance. There is no question that hotel performance is 
influenced by environmental factors from their competitive sets as well as their own prior 
experience. The challenge is then how to configure the use of such resources as input-to-
outcome performance measures. Because it is clear that customer-driven evaluations may 
encourage organizations to learn how to stay competitive in the market place, it is equally 
imperative that hotels know how to utilize both their own operand resources and what 
they have gained from outside as an operant to reduce customer dissatisfaction over time.  
This study acknowledges several limitations. First, the research framework is 
limited to only one external firm evaluation criterion. Using more diverse ways to 
externally evaluate organizations may help generalize the findings. For instance, 
analyzing the differences in terms of media rankings can be one way to conceptualize the 
organizational competitive position. Second, this study used a sample of a limited number 
of hotels in one specific location. This may affect the generalizability of the findings. 
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Using a larger sample from different markets and competitive levels may depict different 
learning patterns. 
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CHAPTER 2 
FIRM RESPONSIVENESS TO CUSTOMERS: A PEER-INDUCED BEHAVIOR 
AND THE IMPACT ON CUSTOMER REVIEWS 
 
2.1. Introduction 
 
 Information disclosure on products/services’ quality may act to reduce 
information asymmetry within markets. Such information may partly originate from 
stakeholders’ (e.g. customers, government/rating agencies) evaluation of firms’ products. 
Past research shows that firms under evaluation may react according to what their 
stakeholders demand. Among others, firms may improve their product quality (e.g. Jin & 
Leslie, 2003; Martins, 2005; Fishman & Levy, 2015) or provide a public response to their 
stakeholders following product quality defaults (Elsbach, 1994, Wang et al. 2016).  
Online markets such as eBay, Amazon, and TripAdvisor are prominent contexts 
in which such information disclosure has been substantially facilitated. These platforms 
enable customers to post reviews on products/services and allow firms/sellers to 
voluntarily respond to customer reviews5. Even though the credibility of individual 
customer reviews are not verifiable by the audience, the positive impact of aggregated 
online customer reviews in revealing quality information and improving customer 
decision making has been well documented in previous research6. However, the question 
remains whether and under what conditions firm response to customer reviews can also 
be a channel for revealing information about firm/product quality? In other words, this 
 
5 For instance, firms may offer apologies, promise to improve, offer compensation to dis-satisfied 
customers, or even respond to reviews to clarify their product/service quality level expectations for future 
customers. 
6 See for example Chevalier and Mayzlin, 2006, Lewis and Zervas, 2016.   
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study seeks to first answer whether a firm’s public response affects its customer reviews, 
indicating whether customers can make better decisions by using such information. 
Second, we assess how the strength of this relationship varies depending on firms’ level 
of available quality signal (particularly among branded and independent firms). Finally, if 
firms’ responsiveness increases customer review ratings, does experience in responding 
play a role in the effectiveness of firms’ responses?  
To answer these questions, this study builds on initial research findings showing 
that firm response may affect customer reviews. Some research shows that firm response 
to customer reviews leads to improvement in subsequent reviews in online market 
platforms (Fradkin et al., 2015; Proserpio & Zervas, 2017). Others, however, found that 
firms’ response can have a limited or even negative impact on customer reviews (Gu & 
Ye, 2014; Chevalier et al. 2018; Ma et al., 2015). Past research mainly attributes firm 
response as a reaction to individual reviews threatening firms’ reputation or image7. 
Nonetheless, it is common that firms respond to non-negative reviews as well. Therefore, 
this study seeks to examine an antecedence of overall responsive behavior among firms 
and measures its impact on customer reviews.  
To do so, this study first argues that responsiveness is driven by competitive peer 
pressure and becomes a widespread practice among firms. That is, as more peer firms 
engage in responding to their reviews within a market, responsiveness develops as an 
expected behavior that ultimately enhances information about quality of 
products/services and customer choice making. Second, because the impact of 
 
7 This in turn generates endogeneity (in form of reverse causality) concern in singling out the effect of firm 
response on customer review ratings.  
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responsiveness depends on the extent to which customers rely on firm response to 
develop expectations about a product/service quality, this study argues that response from 
branded firms has less influence on their customer reviews. Third, as responding to 
reviews becomes a continuous practice for firms, the role of experience in responding to 
customer reviews becomes pronounced as ‘experienced firms’ can craft better response to 
their reviews to enhance their customer reviews .  
This study offers a number of contributions to the literature. First, the study shifts 
from the direct influence of public evaluations on firm reactions to its indirect impact on 
the initiation of a responsive behavior and enforcing information revelation within a 
market. In other words, online markets not only hold firms accountable to customers, but 
may also reduce adverse selection for potential customers. In addition, this study shows 
that the effect is different for branded firms due to their relative informational advantage 
over independent firms, an observation that may reconcile inconsistent previous research 
findings. Further, by including the role of experience, this study synthesizes learning 
theory with firm public communication practices and provides some primary evidence 
that the outcome of responsiveness may be dependent on firm experience. 
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 2.2 reviews the related 
literature. Section 2.3 introduces the theoretical arguments and hypotheses. Section 2.4 
describes the empirical study. Section 2.5 discusses the findings, and Section 2.6 provides 
some discussion and concluding remarks. 
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2.2. Related Literature  
 
 Previous studies showed that “review posting behavior” on online platforms is 
affected by customers’ motivations such as punishing firms, self and/other enhancement 
(Hening-Thurau et al., 2004; Wu & Huberman, 2008; Cheung, 2012; Toubia & Stephen 
2013; Chevalier et al., 2018). Based on the assumption that the presence of a response is 
perceived as a signal of firm attention to customers’ feedback, a number of studies offer 
alternative yet inconsistent explanations on why firm response may lead to different 
outcomes in customer reviews. In the context of the hotel industry, Proserpio & Zervas 
(2017) found that responding to negative reviews increases the overall review ratings 
because of the higher cost of writing low-quality and short negative reviews. Wang & 
Chaudhry (2018) found that efforts in tailoring responses to negative reviews adds value 
and reduces the severity in subsequent negative reviews. Ma et al. (2015), on the other 
hand, show that a firm’s response to reviews on Twitter may encourage more negative 
reviews through activating ‘redress-seeking’ motivation in others. Consistently, Chevalier 
et al. (2018) found that when a hotel manager responds to negative reviews when such 
action is observed by others, customers with negative experience are encouraged to write 
more “response-seeking” reviews. The authors also show that response to positive 
reviews may seem like “promotional” efforts by hoteliers and result in a decline in 
reviews’ ratings. 
 Although previous studies directly link firm response to individual customer 
reviews valence, this study instead argues that firm response can provide extra 
information about products and services that enhance customers’ decision making and 
their reviews. That is, if customer reviews, although they may be biased, are a helpful 
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source of information, firms’ response can also create an additional source of information 
for customers. In addition, it is not clear from previous research whether if firms 
experience a negative consequence from responding to customer reviews, why they 
remain responsive to reviews? In the following section, this study develops theoretical 
arguments that provide a potential explanation for the existence and dissemination of 
responsive behavior within a market. Then, this study sets forward a hypothesis that 
argues that the outcome of such behavior may be positive in a way that increases the 
customer rating.   
2.3.Theoretical Arguments and Hypotheses Development 
2.3.1. Mechanism of Firm Responsiveness  
 
Prior scholarship in the management literature traditionally relates firm 
responsive communication to the impact of legitimacy-threatening information disclosed 
by the media (Pfarrer et al., 2008; Yu et al., 2008), third-party evaluation (Martins, 2005) 
and customers’ reviews (Wang et al., 2016). To deal with negative information disclosure 
from stakeholders, firms may enact "explanations, rationalizations, and legitimation for 
activities undertaken in the organization" which may affect their image in the audiences’ 
mind (Pfeffer, 1981, p. 4); or they may resort to excuses or justifications to protect their 
reputation following negative news (Bettman & Weitz, 1983; Staw et al., 1983).  
Unlike traditional news media or periodic third-party evaluations, many online 
platforms provide opportunities for customers to constantly evaluate firms as well as for 
firms to respond. Firms have the opportunity to have an active role in communication 
with the customers in public domains even when their reputation is not threatened. In this 
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context, as firms develop an incentive to be seen as accountable and committed to 
customers (e.g. Gu & Ye, 2014; Proserpio & Zervas, 2017; Chevalier et al., 2018; Wang 
& Chaudhry, 2018), they may resort to response strategy. According to the institutional 
theory (Meyer & Rowan, 1977; Zucker, 1987), being subject to customer reviews and the 
opportunity to communicate with reviewers generates a setting in which responding 
becomes an expected social norm. As more firms engage in such behavior, customers’ 
expectation to observe responses becomes stronger. Such social norms and expectations 
create increased pressure for firms to take ‘conforming’ actions to remain legitimate 
within their field (Suchman, 1995). 
DiMaggio & Powell (1983) introduced three mechanisms through which social 
(institutional) pressures can be generated and lead to dissemination of isomorphic 
behaviors among firms: mimetic, normative, and coercive. Uncertainty regarding 
organizational technologies, ambiguity in goals, and environments can create a pressure 
to mimic behavior. Adopting certain actions and practices by others (peers) gives the 
impression of legitimacy and leads to mimicry (Hirsch, 1986; Tolbert & Zucker, 1983). 
Mimetic behaviors under uncertain conditions provide a social proof (Briscoe & Safford, 
2008) by observing similar organizations displaying ‘successful’ forms of actions 
(Spender, 1989) such as governance structure (Shipilov et al., 2010), grievance 
procedures (Sutton et al., 1994), multidivisional structures (Fligstein, 2000), and 
management practices (Delmas & Toffel, 2008). 
Normative pressure is generated by active effort of members of an occupation 
through disseminating conditions and methods of recommended actions through 
professional channels (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). Normative pressure may lead to 
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isomorphic conformance to expectations such as conducting expected socialization 
behaviors, language, and dressing style by an organization’s members (Cicourel, 1970; 
Williamson et al., 1975).  
Coercive mechanism for conformance “results from both formal and informal 
pressure exerted on organizations by other organizations upon which they are dependent 
and by cultural expectations in the society within which organizations function” 
(DiMaggio & Powell, 1983, p. 150). That is, institutional pressures may not only result 
from legal forces but also from voluntary diffusion of practices within institutional fields. 
For instance, Tolbert & Zucker (1983) found that the adoption of civil service policies 
and programs depended on how widespread the policies and programs became within the 
institutional environment. Level of diffusion of norms and practices generates 
commensurate levels of pressure that compel organizations to conform. Consistent with 
these finding, this study proposes the following hypothesis:  
H1: The number of peer firms responsive to customers’ evaluation is positively 
related to a firm’s responsiveness.  
2.3.2. Effect of Firm Responsiveness 
 
As discussed above, firms may be forced to become responsive to customer 
reviews as responding becomes an expected behavior. However, the impact of 
responsiveness depends on the perception (belief) of the audience (reviewers and 
observers) about the firms’ intention (e.g. promising better quality in their responses) and 
their real action (e.g. actual quality provision). Because observers cannot directly verify 
firms’ action without becoming customers, only credulous observers rely on firms’ 
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intention to form their belief about their actions8 (Battaglini & Makarov, 2014; Rand, et 
al., 2015). Moreover, such observers may naively develop positive beliefs about a 
responsive firm compared to others without such responses (Luca & Smith, 2015); they 
may be more likely to become future customers and consequently write reviews9. 
However, their belief about a responsive firm may be “corrected” contingent upon an 
actual experience that gauges the firm’s ‘truthfulness’ (consistency between firm’s 
intention and action). That is, firm responsiveness is seen as a “lie” to customers with 
actual inconsistent experiences and stimulates more negativity in their reviews. In other 
words, reviewers with motivation to help others or punish a firm may become more 
critical and detailed in expressing their opinion by observing firm responsiveness (Ma et 
al., 2015; Chevalier et al., 201810) such than they may damage a firm’s reputation.  
In a competitive market, due to the value(cost) of building(damaging) reputation 
through receiving (un)favorable customer reviews, the “enforced” responsiveness can act 
as a disciplinary mechanism driven jointly by potential customer reviews and 
competitors11,12. That is, as firms realize the negative impact of “untruthful” responses on 
their customer ratings, they are encouraged to reduce the inconsistency between their 
intention and actions either by improving their services/products or providing informative 
 
8 If a firm’s actions are not verifiable, ‘rational’ audience may perceive consistent responsiveness by the 
firm as “cheap talk” and ignore its message completely. For a review on cheap talk, see Crawford and 
Sobel (1982).  
9 This is consistent with findings from an experiment in which some eBay buyers paid premium price to 
sellers with unverifiable claims of providing high quality products (Jin & Kato, 2006). 
10 According to the authors the presence of response does not necessarily increase the reviewers’ 
motivation to write more positive and impactful reviews 
11 Similar kind of disciplinary mechanisms have been found in previous research (e.g. Fournier, 1999; Fang 
& Yasuda, 2009, Bakos & Dellarocas, 2011). For a discussion on such mechanisms see MacLeod (2007) 
12 This study acknowledges that, in fact, low quality firms may be able to build a good reputation (high 
ratings) by posting ‘fake positive reviews’ for themselves; however, the possibility of negative reviews 
from future customers who experienced the actual quality can correct such  fake reputation if the actual 
quality does not live up to the displayed ‘good reputation’.   
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responses that help customers to form ‘realistic’ expectations about their quality. That is, 
firms that are mediocre or low quality may not claim high quality in their responses13. 
However, within market firms may have different levels of available signals of 
quality and, therefore, they may experience varying impacts from customer reviews. 
Particularly, brands represent credible signals for consistent and pre-determined quality 
(Aaker, 1995). Thus, they may reduce customers’ reliance on reviews and firm response 
in their decision making. Hollenbeck (2018) shows that customer reviews have a stronger 
effect on independent hotels’ sales compared to that of chain hotels. A similar result was 
also found in the restaurant industry by Luca (2016). The author shows that independent 
restaurants experience stronger effects on demand from customer reviews. Hence, 
independent firms (compared to branded firms) may show a higher incentive to improve 
quality and/or reveal information about current quality in their responses. In either case, 
for independent firms, a relatively higher benefit (cost) of building (damaging) their 
reputation (as a signal to quality) may inhibit untruthful responses to reviews. In line with 
the presented arguments, this study puts forward the following hypothesis: 
H2: Firm responsiveness has a positive impact on customer reviews in a market 
with peer-induced pressure to respond. In addition, the effect is stronger for independent 
(non-branded) firms. 
2.3.3. The Role of Experience  
 
As firms respond to reviews, they may internalize the consequences and learn 
over time to develop ‘better’ responses that help customers to make more informed 
 
13 A similar argument is extended previously by Clemons et al. (2006) 
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decisions. Because responding to various reviews may be perceived differently by the 
audience, responding becomes a sophisticated strategic choice for firms. For example, 
firms may realize that crafting more customized (Wang & Chaudhry, 2018) or detailed 
responses (Chevalier et al., 2018) to negative reviews positively influences future 
reviewers and decreases the number of negative reviews (Proserpio & Zervas, 2017). 
Consistent with the proposition by Battaglini & Makarov (2014), firms may also use 
informative public communications in cases of less severe reviews. 
In any case, through a trial-error process, experience provides firms with a 
repertoire of ‘response-outcome’ knowledge to provide informative responses to either 
manage future expectations or indicate quality improvement. Learning through the 
experience of responding to negative reviews can occur to avoid undesirable 
consequences of responding (e.g. overpromising, redress-seeking and customer churn). 
Therefore, this study suggests that a firm’s experience in responding to negative reviews 
may enhance the impact of response on customer reviews.  
H3: Experience in responding to negative reviews positively moderates the impact 
of a firm’s responsiveness on its customer reviews.  
2.4. Empirical study  
2.4.1. Research context 
 
This study tests the hypotheses in the context of online market platforms which 
have become an influential source of pre-purchase information (Opinion Research Corp. 
2014)14. It is well-evidenced in prior research that online reviews have significant impact 
 
14 For instance, 82% of consumers use online information prior to making purchase decisions. 
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on potential customers’ purchase decisions (Gretzel & Yoo, 2008; Anderson, 2012). This 
study uses TripAdvisor as the context for this study15. TripAdvisor, founded in 2000, is 
now the largest online community, receiving 380 million monthly visits on average and 
has over 435 million customers’ reviews and postings for more than 1.1 million hotels, 
B&Bs, and specialty lodging facilities in 48 markets worldwide. TripAdvisor manages 
and operates 24 other travel media websites around the world and provides access to 
online travel agency sites such as Expedia, Travelocity, hotels.com, and booking.com 
(TripAdvisor, 2016) to facilitate the booking procedure for customers. Along with 
providing the users with online reviews on all listed hotels and facilities, the platform 
also provides a forum for all hoteliers being reviewed by customers to publicly respond to 
their reviewers. Such responses have a lasting effect as they are permanently available for 
future users to access. One advantage of using TripAdvisor is that customers 
autonomously can review any firms on the platform. Therefore, using reviewed hotels 
reduces the potential selection bias in the analysis.   
Initially, this study collected more than 520,000 online customer reviews on 437 
hotels in Manhattan, New York City from 2001 to 2015. This time span allows us to 
examine the social interactions between hotels and reviewers over time. TripAdvisor 
reviews include the reviews’ date, textual content, and whether hoteliers responded to the 
reviews or not. This study used Breens’ algorithm to calculate the sentiment scores of the 
reviews’ texts such that reviews with scores below zero indicate negative valence and 
positive scores represent positive valence (Breen, 2012).  
 
15 Online customer reviews and hotel responses from TripAdvisor have been used by previous researchers 
(see e.g. Chevalier et al. 2018; Wang & Chaudhry, 2018) 
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The sample includes all hotels reviewed within the TripAdvisor platform. The 
hotels range from 2- to 5-star hotels (based on TripAdvisor classification) with different 
types of ownership (chain and independent). Information on other characteristics 
including price levels and size of hotels was also collected from booking.com.  
Some of the hotels were removed from the primary data sample. The decision for 
exclusion was based on hotel closure and lack of sufficient data points for estimation of 
desired coefficients. The dataset (unbalanced panel) ranges from the first quarter of 2006 
to the first quarter of 2015 and includes 350 hotels of which 49% were independent 
hotels. Distribution of hotel classes are: 0.35% 1-star hotels, 4% 2-star hotels, 1.5% 2.5-
star hotels, 22% 3-star hotels, 13% 3.5-star hotels, 13% 3.5-star hotels, 36% 4-star hotels, 
12% 4.5-star hotels, and 9% 5-star hotels. 
All hotels are located in Manhattan, NYC, one of the most attractive locations for 
international and local travelers with different preferences. Manhattan is a highly dense 
and competitive market andhas been used in a number of related studies in the past (e.g. 
Baum & Mezias, 1992; Baum & Lant, 2003), and includes hotels of various classes and 
categories. For this reason, it represents an excellent context to test this study’s 
hypotheses. The hotels are sampled from different districts in Manhattan to account for 
possible impact of relative attractiveness of the hotels on their responding behaviors.  
2.4.2. Dependent variable 
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The dependent variable in this study is the measure of customer review ratings16. 
As mentioned previously, this study collected all reviews targeting all hotels in the 
sample. TripAdvisor allows the reviewers to rate hotels from 1 to 5. The quarterly 
average of review ratings of all hotels was computed to analyze the change in ratings 
over time while controlling for time (year) effects that may influence the trajectory of 
review ratings17. 
2.4.3. Independent variables  
 
To test hypothesis 1 (H1), this study uses the ratio of responsive hotels within 
each hotel class (star-level provided by TripAdvisor platform) as a proxy measure of 
competitive pressure that triggers focal hotel responsiveness. Since hotels with the same 
star-level normally provide similar levels of amenities and services, this study adopts this 
criterion to define reasonable competitive groups. In other words, hotels within the same 
class may compete for similar demand or customers. Finding support of this hypothesis 
allows the study to proceed to testing the second hypothesis.  
To test hypothesis 2 (H2), this study measures hotel responsiveness by dividing 
the number of responses by the total number of reviews received. Consistent with 
previous findings, a hotel may also become more responsive to reviews as a result of poor 
reviews (e.g. Wang et al. 2016). Therefore, responsiveness and average customer ratings 
may simultaneously be determined. One possible way of avoiding endogeneity issues is 
to use the lagged value of responsiveness as an instrument. However, it is suspected that 
 
16 Previous research has repeatedly used online customer review ratings as a proxy measure of quality (e.g. 
Dellarocas et al. 2010; McDevitt , 2014; Zervas et al. 2017; Hollenbeck et al. 2018). 
17 While our purpose is not to observe whether and how hotels respond to individual reviews, an advantage 
of calculating the average review rating is to avoid possible bias in individual reviews and highlight general 
patterns of responsiveness and ratings. (See Clemons et al., 2006) 
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responsiveness has a carry-over effect on average customer ratings because some 
customers may infer firm quality by reading through not only recent but also past hotel 
responses to reviews. Thus, using the lagged variable of responsiveness will not be a 
sound choice of instrument in the analysis18. Instead, this study utilizes a “competitive 
pressure” variable as an instrument that meets the two instrumental variable conditions: 
correlation with the independent variable (relevance) and independence from the 
dependent variable (orthogonality). The choice of the instrument will be further discussed 
in section 2.4.5. In addition, an interaction term was created by multiplying 
responsiveness and branded hotels to test the hypothesis that chain hotels may experience 
less impact on customer reviews by responding.    
To test the third hypothesis (H3) regarding the moderating effects of experience 
on review ratings, we created another interaction variable between responsiveness and 
experience in responding to negative reviews. In this study, experience is measured in a 
relative term by subtracting the accumulated quarterly number of negative responses 
from that of the peer group within the same class (star-level) and a dummy variable was 
created to indicate “experienced hotel” as ones with higher levels of experience than the 
average.  
2.4.4. Control variables 
 
First, the lagged average of reviews was included to control for the partial 
adjustment mechanism normally observed in firm performance. Since a hotel rating is a 
function of how well the hotel is performing based on customer reviews, inclusion of the 
 
18 See Reed (2015) for additional discussion.   
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lagged dependent variable adjusts the model for past performance (based on customer 
reviews) and possible carry-over effects in customer reviews which were found in 
previous studies (e.g. Hu et al. 2006, Moe & Schweidel 2012). In addition to average past 
customer review ratings, cumulative number of reviews (seen as a potential signal of 
hotel quality), can affect customers’ choice and their subsequent reviews. Hence, this 
study controls for those factors. Both unobserved and observed time-invariant hotel 
characteristics such as certain classes (star-level provided by TripAdvisor’s experts), size, 
locations, and chain affiliation may affect hotel ratings. To control for such effects, 
property level fixed effects were included in the regressions. This study also controls for 
year and seasonal effects on customer ratings to control for common shocks in the market 
that may affect customer reviews. Finally, the yearly moving average of peers’ customer 
reviews was included to capture possible market level changes in quality which may 
incentivize a hotel to improve on quality and subsequently enhance its customer reviews.  
2.4.5. Model and Estimation  
 
The final dataset consists of 350 hotels with 4,620 observations (from 2007 to 
2015)19 . This study builds the first model to test whether the competitive pressure for 
being responsive (H1) increases hotel responsiveness:  
                          𝑅𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽2𝑋𝑖𝑡 +  𝛾𝑖 +  𝜀𝑖𝑡 , with  i =  1, … , N and t =
1, … , T                         (1)                      
 
19 Because the main purpose of the study is to examine the effect of peer pressure on a firm’s 
responsiveness level, this study excluded the observations for which the percentage of responsive peers was 
zero. This study re-estimates the model by including all observations and creating a dummy variable that 
indicates whether the percentage of responsive peers is zero or not. While the sign of the main coefficient 
of hotel responsiveness remained the same; interestingly, customer reviews for responsive hotels were 
lower when their competitors were not responsive.    
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Where 𝛽0 is the intercept and 𝑅𝑖𝑡 denotes the quarterly average of customer 
review ratings of hotel i at time t. 𝑋𝑖𝑡 is a matrix of variables that affect hotel rating 
including time-variant independent and control variables. 𝛾𝑖 is a matrix of observed and 
unobserved hotel-specific time-invariant characteristics (fixed effects).  
As mentioned previously, Model (1) has endogeneity issues between the main 
independent variable (responsiveness) and the dependent variable (average rating)20. 
Hence, this study employs an instrumental variable (IV) approach in a two-step 
regression using least squared estimation. The choice of instrumental variable, which also 
corresponds to the first hypothesis, is the percentage of responsive peers at time t-1. The 
instrument meets the orthogonality and correlation conditions. Intuitively, as long as the 
instrument is unrelated to unobserved variables that affect the average rating of a hotel, 
the instrument would satisfy the first condition. Despite the lack of an official test for 
orthogonality condition, the percentage of responsive peers is unlikely to be jointly 
determined with average ratings or other unobserved variables that affect average rating 
at time t. The second condition is satisfied by observing a significant estimated 
correlation coefficient of the instrument in the first-stage regression21. 
Since this study accounts for possible dynamics in hotels’ rating by including the 
lagged independent variable, it automatically introduces another source of endogeneity 
because of an apparent correlation between lagged dependent variable and the error terms 
in Model (2).  According to the estimation procedure introduced by Anderson & Hsiao 
(1981), the second and lag of dependent variables were chosen as another instrument in 
 
20 A chi-square test confirmed the endogeneity of responsiveness in the model (P value= 0.000).  
19 See Table 6.  
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the models. This instrument is correlated with first lag of dependent variable and 
uncorrelated with the error terms (𝐸[𝑦𝑖𝑡−2𝜀𝑖𝑡] = 0). This study uses ‘xtivreg2’ command 
in STATA with cluster (hotel) robust standard error to estimate the models’ 
coefficients22. 
To test the second and third hypotheses of moderating effects of brand affiliation 
and experience in responsiveness on customer reviews, the interaction terms of 
(responsiveness × chain hotel) and (responsiveness × experienced hotel) were entered in 
the main model23. 
2.5. Results 
 
 Table 4 reports the descriptive statistics. Table 5 shows the correlations among 
the main variables used in the regression models.  
Hypothesis 1 tests the impact of peer pressure, resulting from an increase in the 
number of responsive rivals, on focal hotel responsiveness to customer reviews. As 
discussed before, Hypothesis 1 was tested through the first-stage regression models 
presented in Table 6. The table also summarizes estimated coefficients for the variables 
used as instruments for the endogenous variables (responsiveness, lagged average rating, 
and the interaction terms regarding the second and third hypotheses).  
 
22 Model (1) was tested using OLS estimation without including the instruments to observe whether 
including the selected instruments changes the estimated coefficients of firm responsiveness, as a sign of 
inconsistency in OLS estimation. The results show the IV approach generates the predicted theoretical 
result: the effect of responsiveness becomes stronger compared with the results obtained from OLS 
regressions.  See Appendix 1. 
Also, for robustness check, squared terms of control variables, cumulative reviews, total number of positive 
and negative reviews were included in the estimation. However, the significance and the direction of the 
estimated coefficient of responsiveness remained unchanged.  
23  𝑅𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 +  𝛽1𝑅𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝑋𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽3𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑝𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑣𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4(𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑝𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑣𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑡 × 𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑖𝑛 ℎ𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑡) + 𝜀𝑖𝑡                        
Model (2) 
     𝑅𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑅𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑝𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑣𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5(𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑝𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑣𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑡 × 𝐸𝑥𝑝. 𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑝𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑣𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑡−1) +  𝜀𝑖𝑡    
Model (3) 
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In Model (1), the significant and positive coefficient for responsive peers at time 
t-1 indicates that an increase in percentage of responsive peers results in higher response 
rates of focal hotels at time t. This finding is consistent across all three models in Table 6. 
Importantly, these results confirm the relevance of the instrument24. In this same vein, the 
results show that the relevance of the second lag of average customer review ratings 
being used as an instrument for first lag of average ratings.  
Table 7 reports the estimated coefficients of the second-stage regressions related 
to the second and third hypotheses. While, due to the models’ specification (i.e. fixed 
effects), this study cannot directly observe the effects of time-invariant variables (e.g. 
star-level, chain or branded hotel) on average review ratings, the coefficients for time-
varying variables are estimable. Model (1) in Table 7 includes the main independent 
variable (responsiveness) as well as the control variables that may affect the hotels’ 
average customer ratings. The estimated coefficient of hotel responsiveness is positive 
and significant, indicating that an increase in responsiveness can result in higher 
customer review ratings; evidence supporting the second hypothesis. In addition, the 
results show that the number of positive and negative reviews has positive and negative 
impacts on average ratings, respectively. Cumulative number of reviews shows a 
significant and negative impact on average ratings25. This study further re-estimated the 
model across two time periods (2007-2009 and 2012-2014) to observe the effects of time 
on the impact of hotels’ responsiveness. Based on a conjecture that, in the earlier years, 
 
24 The semi-partial correlation of responsiveness with the peer pressure variable at t is 0.45 in the first 
model.  
25 A curvilinear effect (U-shaped) of cumulative reviews on average ratings was detected after including its 
squared term. However, the sign and significance of estimated coefficients of responsiveness remains 
unchanged.  
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customers may not have extensively used customer reviews on TripAdvisor, hotels may 
experience less pressure to respond to the reviews. However, as the platform became 
mature and popular among customers, firms may have reacted differently as the 
competition for better customer reviews increased. Interestingly, some evidence was 
found showing that the impact of responsiveness is negative but insignificant in the early 
period, but it becomes positive and significant during the later years26. See Appendix 2.  
Model (2) in Table 7 shows consistent findings with regard to the second part of 
Hypothesis 2: increases in responsiveness have stronger effects on customer reviews for 
independent hotels. The negative and partially significant coefficient of interaction 
variable (responsiveness × branded hotel) weakly confirms this hypothesis. According to 
Hypothesis 3, Model (3) tests a moderating effect of experience of responding to negative 
reviews (a learning effect) on the relationship between responsiveness and customer 
review ratings. The positive but insignificant coefficient of the interaction variable 
(responsiveness × experienced hotel) does not support the third hypothesis that hotels 
with more experience may craft ‘better’ responses to their reviewers to manage their 
quality expectations and avoid negative reviews in the future. This study also re-estimates 
Model (3) and tests if the effect varies based on brand affiliation. The results (see 
Appendix 3) show that the relationship is partially significant for chain hotels, implying 
that the positive impact of experience may be limited to branded hotels that may possess 
systematic learning processes and strategies for effective responsiveness.  
 
26 This study also tests the effect of responsiveness on customer ratings based on whether firms have ‘built 
reputation’ or not. To operationalize this reputation variable, hotels were categorized based on the number 
of reviews at time t relative to that of the average of its rivals. Hotels with more than the average number of 
reviews for their rivals were considered ‘reputed hotels’. The results showed that the effect of 
responsiveness is stronger when firms have not built their reputation (not reputed). See Appendix 4. 
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Table 4 Summary statistics 
 
Variable # Obs. Mean SD Min Max 
Average review ratings (log) 4,620 1.407 0.130 0 1.609 
Responsiveness (%) 4,620 0.564 0.376 0.005 1 
Response experience (log) 4,620 4.417 1.763 0.095 8.176 
Responsive peers (%) 4,620 0.494 0.138 0.018 0.781 
Cumulative number of reviews  4,620 712.511 785.193 1 6687 
Number of negative reviews 4,620 3.915 6.703 0 99 
Number of positive reviews 4,620 55.756 53.114 0 372 
Hotel size (number of rooms) (log) 4,600 2.248 0.355 0.602 3.291 
Chain hotel  4,612 0.491 0.499 0 1 
Hotel Price level 1 4,612 0.061 0.240 0 1 
Hotel Price level 2 4,612 0.189 0.392 0 1 
Hotel Price level 3 4,605 0.238 0.426 0 1 
Hotel Price level 4 4,612 0.244 0.429 0 1 
Hotel Price level 5 4,620 0.265 0.441 0 1 
Hotel Class 1 (star level) 4,612 0.001 0.041 0 1 
Hotel Class 2 4,612 0.040 0.197 0 1 
Hotel Class 2.5 4,612 0.015 0.124 0 1 
Hotel Class 3 4,612 0.230 0.421 0 1 
Hotel Class 3.5 4,612 0.139 0.346 0 1 
Hotel Class 4 4,612 0.364 0.481 0 1 
Hotel class 4.5 4,612 0.121 0.326 0 1 
Hotel Class 5 4,620 0.091 0.287 0 1 
Upper town district  4,612 0.100 0.300 0 1 
Lower town district 4,612 0.204 0.403 0 1 
Wall-street district 4,612 0.047 0.212 0 1 
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Midtown east district 4,612 0.187 0.390 0 1 
Lower East district 4,612 0.021 0.144 0 1 
China town district 4,612 0.011 0.106 0 1 
Times square district 4,620 0.427 0.494 0 1 
 
 
Table 5 Correlation coefficients for time-variant variables 
 
 
variable    1   2    3 4 5 6  7 
1 Average review ratings(log)  1.00       
2 Responsiveness (%) 0.02 1.00      
3 Response experience (log)  0.16 0.54 1.00     
4 Responsive peers (%) 0.24 0.17 0.45 1.00    
5 Cumulative number of reviews  0.05 0.03 0.55 0.30 1.00   
6 Number of negative reviews -0.33 0.03 0.33 0.16 0.60 1.00  
7 Number of positive reviews 0.18 0.04 0.55 0.34 0.80 0.59 1.00 
 
 
 
 
Table 6 First-stage IV regression coefficients and t-statistics 
 
 Model (1)  Model (2) Model (3) 
Endogenous  variables 
 
Excluded instruments 
Av. 
rating  
(t-1) 
Resp.(t) Av. rating  
(t-1) 
Resp.(t) 
 
Resp.(t) 
×chain  
Av. rating  
(t-1) 
Resp.(t) 
 
Resp.(t) 
×exp. 
 
         
Av. review ratings  
(t-2) 
 
 
0.152*** 
(0.020) 
t= 7.36 
-0.065 
(0.060) 
t= -1.08 
0.153*** 
(0.020) 
t=7.38 
-0.066 
(0.061) 
t=-1.08 
-0.052 
(0.043) 
t=-1.20 
0.152*** 
(0.020) 
t=7.35 
-0.065 
(0.061) 
t=-1.07 
0.530 
(0.036) 
t=-0.63 
Responsive peers 
(t-1) 
 
 
0.027** 
(0.010) 
t=-2.75 
0.331*** 
(0.033) 
t=9.67 
0.026* 
(0.011) 
t=-2.28 
0.310*** 
(0.043) 
t=7.07 
-0.049* 
(0.021) 
t=-2.35 
-0.027** 
(0.010) 
t=-2.73 
0.324*** 
(0.034) 
t=9.38 
0.017 
(0.021) 
t=0.82 
Responsive peers 
(t-1) × 
Chain  
 
   0.060 
(0.073) 
t=0.82 
0.545*** 
(0.055) 
t=9.83 
   
Responsive peers 
(t-1) × 
Experienced hotel(t) 
 
 
    -0.003* 
(0.008) 
t=-0.36 
0.052 
(0.050) 
t=1.05 
1.051*** 
(0.059) 
t=17.79 
         
Number of clusters 
(hotels) 
 
300 300 299 299 299 300 300 300 
Observations 
 
4180 4180 4172 4172 4172 4180 4180 4180 
F test for excluded 
instruments 
33.96 47.80 23.52 32.52 33.30 22.64 32.27 106.59 
Note: The dependent variable is the log of average of customer review rating. Only observations with non-zero values of responsive peers are included. 
Cluster heteroskedasticity robust standard errors in parentheses. † p < 0.1; * p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001 
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Table 7 The effect of hotel responsiveness on customer review rating 
 
Dependent variable:  
av. review ratings (log) 
Model (1) Model (2) Model (3)27 
 
Responsiveness(t) 
 
0.115**(0.038) 0.153**(0.047) 0.110**(0.040) 
Responsiveness(t) ×  
Branded hotel 
 
 -0.074†(0.039)  
Responsiveness(t) × 
Experienced hotel 
 
  0.010(0.009) 
# Negative reviews(t) -0.0006***(0.0008) -0.006***(0.0008) -0.006***(0.0008) 
# Positive reviews(t) 0.0007***(0.0001) 0.0007***(0.0001) 0.0007***(0.0001) 
Cumulative # reviews(t) -2.9E-5**(9.42E-6) -2.9E-5**(9.41E-6) -3.0E-5***(9.44E-6) 
Average ratings(t-1) 0.563**(0.215) 0.541*(0.214) 0.563**(0.216) 
Peers’ average rating (t) 0.015*(0.007) 0.014† (0.007 0.016*(0.007) 
 
Season fixed effects 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Hotel fixed effect Yes Yes Yes 
 
Weak identification test  
(Cragg-Donald Wald F 
statistic) 
 
33.07 
 
25.83 
 
26.32 
# of cluster (hotel) 300 299 300 
Observations 4180 4172 4180 
𝑅2 0.47 0.46 0.47 
Note: cluster heteroskedasticity robust standard errors in parentheses. † p < 0.1; * p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; 
*** p < 0.001. 
 
2.6. Discussion and Contributions 
  
 In this chapter, a study of the impact of firm public response to customer reviews 
in online platforms was presented. Customer reviews may not only facilitate information 
sharing among customers, they also create a constant opportunity for organization to 
publically communicate with their audience by responding to customer reviews. The 
question that remains whether that is what propels firms’ responsiveness. Also, whether 
 
27 Marginal effects of responsiveness in model 2 and 3 are 0.117 and 0.115, respectively.  
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and under what conditions is responsiveness beneficial for firms? To answer these 
questions, this study first hypothesizes that the peer pressure from responsive rivals may 
derive a focal firm reaction to respond to its reviews as well. This study utilized this 
initial conjecture to implement an instrumental variable approach and hypothesized that 
responsiveness has positive impacts on customer review ratings by reducing firms’ 
“untruthful” (uninformative) responses to customer reviews. Untruthful responses are 
inhibited by the potential cost of damage to firms’ reputation. Reputation damage may  
occur if customers become misled by firms’ untruthful response and they decide to write 
negative reviews.  
Moreover, the current study showed some evidence whether the impact of brands and 
firm experience in responding to reviews has moderating effects on customer reviews. 
The study found that firm responsiveness has a weaker effect for branded hotels relative 
to independent hotels. Such a finding further signifies the role of the brand as a strong 
quality signal that may ‘insulate’ branded hotels from the effects of customer reviews on 
hotels performance such as sales. Further, some support was found for the hypothesis that 
firms with experience in response to customers may be more effective in terms of how 
they deliver their responses to avoid customer negative reviews that may damage their 
reputation; however, the effect is limited to branded hotels which may follow more 
effective procedures to respond and learn from negative customer reviews.  
This study provides three distinct contributions to the literature. First, it extends 
the current literature related to firms’ reactivity (responsiveness) to third-party public 
performance evaluation. Most previous research on this topic offers explanations of 
firms’ response (reactions) toward public negative evaluations (e.g. by media, ranking 
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institutions, investors (e.g. Martins, 2005; Espeland & Sauder, 2007; Ward et al., 2009)). 
In contrast, this study provides an alternative explanation in the context of online 
platforms in which firms may face constant customer evaluations. The need for firms’ 
response to customers will be more pronounced as such platforms grow in popularity. 
Moreover, this study highlights how those online platforms provide a natural context in 
which firms can closely observe their rivals’ behavior. Hence, this study brings into the 
picture the impact of observable competitors’ actions on behavior formation among firms 
competing within the same channel. This impact may result in increased information 
revelation and efficiency in the market place.  
The second contribution involves confirming the potential benefit of firm 
responsiveness. Previous research on the impact of firm response to customer reviews 
offers some (inconsistent) evidence on the short-run effect of public response on reviews 
(Proserpio & Zervas, 2017; Chevalier et al., 2018; Wang & Chaudhry, 2018). However, 
building on the argument that firms’ untruthful responses may intensify negative 
customer reviews and damage firms’ current reputation (achieved by past customer 
reviews), this study provides some evidence that reputational concern can increase 
informative responses under competition and consequently boost customer reviews. This 
study, therefore,  contribute to empirical studies concerning firms’ claim making in 
response to online customer reviews (e.g. Jin & Kato, 2006; Proserpio & Zervas, 2017; 
Chevalier et al., 2018; Elfenbein et al., 2018).  
The third contribution relates to the impact that brand and experience have on 
communication (response) outcomes. This study finds some evidence that brand (as a 
signal of quality) reduces the impact of firms’ response. Further, in line with the recent 
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research focusing on the positive impacts of message tailoring (Wang & Chaudhry, 
2018), the content and style of firms’ response to individual customer reviews (Wang et 
al. 2016), this study introduces a learning effect that may generate a condition under 
which firms become more effective in responding to reviews in order to minimize 
potential damage to firms’ reputations. Thus, response experience, if exploited, may 
become a source of competitive advantage and helps a firm to choose the ‘best’ response 
to individual customer reviews.  
This study also relates to business practitioners whose products and services are 
under constant customer evaluations and need to craft appropriate responses to customer 
reviews.  Many platforms such as Amazon, eBay, and TripAdvisor not only facilitate 
customer evaluation through a review system, but also provide means for firms to 
communicate with customers. As customer reviews may have an impact on firms, firms’ 
actions may entail severe impacts on future business as well. Hence, it seems necessary 
for firms to develop clear strategies for managing their online communications, as many 
potential customer look for ‘useful’ and ‘clear’ informational clues on only firms’ quality 
but also other characteristics such as trustworthiness, accountability. This study found 
that hotels may exhibit responsive behavior because their peers within the online platform 
show the same behavior. Therefore, similar to brick-and-mortar businesses in which front 
office staff and employees’ behaviors have direct impact on customers, investment in 
recruiting and training responsible ‘online front office’ staff seems to be inevitable to 
ensure sustainability in online business.  
These findings also provide some implications for online review platforms’ 
design. Given firms normally have incentive to gain public appeal in their 
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communications, they may provide non-verifiable responses (babbling) (Almazan et al. 
2008), or simply increase the amount of information they disclose to their audience 
(jamming) to avert the expectation for responsiveness (e.g. Beiley et al. 2003). To deal 
with such possible issues, platform designers can provide the users with informative 
content by summarizing firm-generated information through various techniques such as 
text mining and content analysis.   
This study acknowledges a number of limitations. Generalizability of the findings 
is limited due to firms are sampled from a single market. In markets with different levels 
of competition, the response behavior could be different and in turn customers may 
perceive firm response variably. In other words, although the institutional theory 
prescribes that firms’ actions, in this case responsiveness, are driven by external factors, 
it does not fully explain possible differences in firms’ actions. Finding an answer to this 
question calls for further research on how potential organizational factors, for instance, 
can moderate firms’ reaction to external pressure for conforming actions. Finally, this 
study only examines the extent to which firms respond to reviews and its overall impact 
on ratings. However, more nuanced analysis on response types to reviews concerning 
various aspects of customer experience could shed more light on how exactly firms’ 
responses can influence customer ratings.  
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CHAPTER 3 
 SPATIAL PRICE COMPETITION IN THE HOTEL MARKET: THE ROLE OF 
ONLINE REPUTATION, QUALITY, AND LOCATION  
3.1. Introduction 
 
 The notion that firms’ strategic behavior (e.g. pricing) and the resulting market 
equilibrium depend on how similar competitors’ products (or services) are has been well-
studied and documented in the economics literature. One can think of this similarity in 
terms of how close competitors are in terms of their products’ attributes (e.g. Berry et al., 
1995) or in terms of their geographical proximity (e.g. Hotelling, 1929; Salop 1979). 
Under this approach, products are thought of as being located in a “characteristics space” 
(e.g. Hotelling, 1929; Lancaster, 1966, 1979). This approach allows firms to compete 
with each other with differing intensity: products located closer to each other in 
characteristics space would compete aggressively with each other, and less so with rivals 
that offer products with different attributes (or that are geographically distant). Given that 
product similarity implies stronger competition, firms often make great efforts to 
differentiate their products from those of their competitors. 
While there is a natural tendency to become differentiated (i.e. offer distinct 
products), the distribution of consumer preferences over the attribute space can give rise 
to “localized” competition. Under this notion, firms compete for customers to the extent 
that those customers are seeking products with the characteristics of the product being 
offered; if many customers have strong preferences for particular attributes, then many 
firms may locate close to each other (on or around that those attributes).  
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Prior work, has, by and large, studied localized competition assuming that product 
attributes are “fixed”. However, in many industries certain product attributes may be 
“variable” (i.e. are frequently be updated). The prime example of such product attribute is 
a product’s online rating (which can be interpreted as a proxy for a product’s overall 
quality). The increasing importance of online shopping raises the question of whether the 
notion (and empirical results) of localized competition in fixed attributes space extends to 
time-varying attributes, such as firms’ online reputation. This paper contributes to the 
empirical literature regarding this dimension. 
An ideal setting for this study is the lodging industry. On the one hand, fixed 
product attributes (geographic location, hotel tier) are central to characterizing 
competition among hotels. On the other hand, the lodging industry is heavily influenced 
by online platforms (e.g. TripAdvisor, Expedia). These platforms facilitate consumers’ 
search for information regarding their fixed attributes as well as their time-varying 
attributes (i.e. consumers’ overall hotel rating). These platforms, through aggregation of 
consumer reviews ratings and volume, provide measures of hotel “reputation” that are 
continually updated. It has been well-documented that these online measures are of 
economic importance in the lodging industry as they have been found to be associated 
with higher revenues (e.g. Lewis & Zervas, 2016).28 More generally, firms have a strong 
incentive to invest in building and maintaining good reputation when the quality of 
products is not fully observable (e.g. Shapiro, 1983). This study seeks to understand the 
role of online reputation on market competition through the lens of product 
differentiation models. To best of the author’s knowledge, this study is the first to look at 
 
28 These authors find that a one percentage point increase in a hotel’s rating is associated with 1.5% and 
6.5% increase in its price and demand, respectively. 
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the role of online reputation on price competition in the lodging market in this type of 
models.29 
Specifically, this study assesses the role of three main dimensions over which 
(localized) competition might occur in the lodging industry.  The first dimension is 
geography: hotels’ proximity to each other on a map. The second dimension is hotels’ 
“quality” rating; this rating information is provided by a third-party organization based on 
whether a hotel meets a certain number of characteristics or attributes and categorizes 
hotels into different classes or “tiers” (from 1 through 5 stars; 5-star being the highest 
quality tier); by construction, this product attribute is fixed as a hotel tier does not change 
over time. The third dimension is hotels’ online reputation (generated from consumers’ 
online reviews/ratings of a hotel). One can think of this variable also as a measure of 
quality, with the difference that this variable is generated by consumers (and not by a 
third-party company) and that it is constantly updated. The overarching empirical 
question is to investigate the degree to which firms’ proximity to rivals (along these three 
dimensions) drives hotels’ pricing decisions in the hotel market. This study investigates: 
a) which of the three factors of product differentiation matters most for hotels’ pricing 
decisions, and b) whether and to what extent competition is localized: i.e. limited to (or 
driven by) the nearest, or most similar, competitors in fixed and variable characteristics 
space. 
This research studies the role of the three dimensions of product differentiation 
(geography, quality, online reputation) as drivers of (localized) price competition in the 
Manhattan hotel market. The empirical approach employs distance metric technique 
 
29 Related literature on the role of online reviews (e.g. on sales) is reviewed in section 3.2. 
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developed by Pinkse et al. (2002), a method that is particularly well-suited for dealing 
with competition among a large number of firms. With this approach, one models each 
firm’s price reaction function to be dependent on the prices of all other rival hotels. In a 
nutshell, Pinkse et al. (2002) propose to model the slope of the reaction function (between 
firm i and j) to depend on the pairwise distance (in product space) between firms (i and j). 
The technique has two advantages. First, it allows the researcher to avoid the 
dimensionality problem (a large number of estimable parameters) that arises when 
modeling price reaction functions in differentiated products markets. Second, and more 
importantly for the purposes of this study, the approach allows for empirical tests of 
which dimensions of the product space matter most for price competition (in the case of 
current study, the three noted product space dimensions - geography, quality, and 
reputation) in the Manhattan hotel market.  
To implement the model, this study collects and employs a detailed daily dataset 
of hotel prices spanning 161 hotels over a period of 2.5 years (926 days) and match it 
with daily online reputation (volume and average rating) measures scrapped from 
TripAdvisor’s website.30 According to the purpose of this study, the results aim to show 
which hotels attributes (location, quality, reputation) are more important in determining 
the intensity of competition among hotels. Further, the results seek to highlight whether 
competition in this industry is highly localized. In other words, this study seeks to explain 
to what extent hotels within geographical proximity react to each other’s pricing 
 
30 Modeling price competition in this industry on a daily basis is important since hotel managers are, given 
the fixed capacity, actively engaged in setting daily prices to maximize the revenue (Anderson & Xie, 
2010; Talluri & Van Ryzin, 2004). 
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behavior. To this end, it tests whether the prices of four closest hotels explain a focal 
hotel’s price.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Sections 3.2 reviews the relevant 
literature and contrast it with the aims and scope of the current study. Section 3.3 
describes the data and methodology. Section 3.4 discusses the findings, and Section 3.5 
provides some discussion and concluding remarks.   
3.2. Literature Review   
 
 The literature on product differentiation and its ramifications (e.g. market power) 
is vast. In this section this study limits the review of past research on product 
differentiation on work most closely related to this study: localized competition and the 
role of reputation on price competition. In doing so, this study highlights work related to 
the lodging as well as other similar industries. 
3.2.1. Product differentiation and localized product competition 
 
 The price competition model of Hotelling (1929), which allows for a single 
dimension for product differentiation, has been expanded to allow for (more realistic) 
multiple dimensions (e.g. d’Aspremont et al., 1979; Anderson et al., 1989; Deneckere & 
Rothschild, 1992; Feenstra & Levinsohn, 1995). Empirical work has followed this more 
realistic depiction of markets. For instance, to study price competition among 
differentiated products, Pinkse & Slade (2004) consider alcohol content and product 
types (e.g. premium, regular and light) of various beer products as sources of product 
differentiation, while Berry et al. (1995) use various automobile attributes (such as 
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weight and fuel efficiency).  The role of geographic proximity (as opposed to proximity 
in attribute space) has also been studied (e.g. Pinkse et al., 2002).  
In both types of empirical work (those considering non-geographic sources of 
product differentiation as well as those that entertain geographic location as a key 
element in the analysis), the role of localized competition has been noted.  Proximity in 
attribute (non-geographic) space has been found to be crucial in a number of empirical 
studies including Bresnahan (1981, 1987), Feenstra and Levinsohn (1995), Berry et al. 
(1995), Kalnins (2003), Pinkse & Slade (2004), Richards et al. (2008), and Pennerstorfer 
(2009). In these studies, products that are located near each other in product space 
compete more fiercely (display larger cross-price elasticities) than those that are farther 
apart.  The role of localized competition among firms in geographic space has also been 
noted, especially in industries where products are less prone to differentiation in attribute 
space such as movie theaters (Davis, 2006), gasoline (Pinkse et al., 2002; Clemenz & 
Gugler, 2006), and hotels (Lado-Sestayo et al., 2016). A common practice to determine 
the proximity in attribute or geographic spaces is to compute and use (the inverse) of the 
Euclidean distance between products (e.g. Pinkse et al., 2002; Pinkse & Slade, 2004; 
Rojas, 2008). One additional element that contributes to localized competition is the issue 
of bounded rationality: firms partition their competitive environment and limit their 
reaction to a few immediate neighboring competitors (Gripsrud & Grønhaug, 1985, 
discuss this issue in grocery retailing; Lant and Baum, 1995 analyze the lodging 
industry). 
In the lodging industry, studies have shown that proximity in geographic location 
(Chung & Kalnins, 2001) and firm attributes, including chain(brand) affiliation, quality 
 
 
59 
 
(proxied by different price scales) and firm size, influence consumers’ choices and results 
in more intense competition among hotels (Buam & Mezais, 1992; Becerra et al., 2013; 
Lee, 2015). In summary, prior findings have noted that hotels’ proximity (both 
geographic as well as in attributes, such as quality are important factors in the 
competitive environment. This study differentiates from previous research by attributing 
quality to two different measures: fixed hotel star-rating and dynamic customer-defined 
reputation.31 This study uses detailed daily data in one of the largest lodging markets in 
the world to formally (and systematically) evaluate some of these earlier findings: a) the 
role of geographic location and quality on price competition, and b) the existence of 
localized competition (i.e. competition confined among the closest rivals). Regarding 
localized competition in hotel industry, this study’s approach is similar to Baum and 
Mezias (1992) and Kalnins (2016) studies of hotel failure rate due to competition. The 
authors examine localized competition with the conjecture that firms compete with others 
within “a certain range of their own position” (or called “competitive window”) and firms 
outside of the range have no impact of the intensity of competition. However, relative 
firm positions (due to change in quality) and market size (due to firm entry/exit) may 
vary over time. This approach allows for including such dynamics in determining 
competitive windows for each hotel.     
 
 
 
31  As noted by Pavlou and Dimoka (2006), reputation generated by customer feedback and reviews act as a 
source of differentiation among sellers and create price premium for reputable sellers in eBay online 
auctions. 
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3.2.2. Reputation and product differentiation  
 
 While consumers agree that, all else equal, higher quality products are preferable 
to lower quality ones, it is not always the case that information about a product’s quality 
remains fixed in time and that is readily available to consumers.32  Further, in the absence 
of direct observation of product quality, firms selling products of similar quality may be 
perceived by consumers as being different because one firm may have a superior 
“reputation” (e.g. Caves & Williamson, 1985; Podolny, 1993), a possibility that can be 
considered as another possible source of product differentiation. Finally, under conditions 
of quality uncertainty, consumers can use a product’s reputation (created by sellers’ past 
actions) to infer/proxy for quality (Spence, 1974; Podolny 1993)33 and reward reputable 
sellers through higher paid price (Shapiro, 1983)34. 
Inherent in many online markets is reputation mechanisms based on a complete 
record of customer feedback (reviews) about sellers or products. Chen & Xie (2008) 
proposed that online consumer review has become an almost free new element of the 
marketing communication mix for firms. Unlike other forms of marketing strategies (i.e. 
advertising), however, the information conveyed by online reviews is not generated by 
the firm, but by prior users of the product. Using online market platforms, buyers can 
easily locate products based on their most favorable features, such as location and price, 
with minimum search costs. To help customers infer quality of products, these platforms 
 
32 According to Perloff & Salop (1986), as the degree of information about all firms in a market moves 
toward perfection, the equilibrium price also falls to the competitive price.   
33 Particular to online market, research has indicated the impact of quality information such as ranking 
(Ghose et el., 2014; Chen & Yao, 2016, Ursu, 2108), popularity (Filippas & Gramstad, 2016), customer-
return rate to seller (Jaffe et al., 2017) on consumer purchase decisions.  
34 See Resnick et al. (2006) for a survey of the literature  on the impact of reputation on price  
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collect and summarize customer reviews about their consumption experience (consumer-
created information) and rank products accordingly.   
The empirical effects of online reviews has been noted at length, repeatedly 
showing the positive impact of average rating on sales for different products and services 
including restaurants, books, movies, and hotels (e.g. Chevalier & Mayzlin, 2006; Duan 
et al, 2008; Anderson, 2012; Anderson & Magruder, 2012; Lewis & Zervas, 2016; Luca, 
2016)35. Particular to the lodging industry, higher prior customer review ratings was 
shown to increase ‘willingness to pay’ in other customers (Nieto-García & Muñoz-
Gallego, 2017).36  Further, research has shown that while average rating matters, 
consumers also care about the volume of reviews (Park et al., 2007; Cheung, 2012; Cui et 
al., 2012; Blal & Struman, 2014). However, unlike the research we present in this paper 
(which looks at price competition), previous studies have been mainly concerned with the 
impact of online customer reviews on individual firms’ performance (i.e. sales volume).37  
The increasing availability of online costumers’ reviews has dramatically affected 
the noted aspects regarding the availability of information about products’ quality and the 
role of reputation as a source of product differentiation (or proxy for quality). On the one 
hand, online reviews have increased the amount of information consumers have to assess 
a product’s quality. Further, online reviews have become an important tool for firms’ 
 
35 See Floyd et al. 2014 for a review.  
36 In this vein, Abrate & Viglia (2016) used the average of online customer ratings as an attribute in 
determining hotel price.  
37 Other work has shown that online market platforms’ have reduced price dispersion (Bar-Isaac et al. 
2012,), increased price competition (Brown & Goolsbee, 2002; Bar-Isaac et al. 2012), enhanced product 
diversity (Brynjolfsson et al., 2003), higher incentive for quality investment (Fishman & Levy, 2015), and 
more reputable sellers (Hui et al. 2014). Importantly, the internet-enabled technologies and platforms such 
as eBay, Amazon, TripAdvisor have significantly reduced informational asymmetries and consequently 
have led to an increase in consumer surplus (Lewis & Zervas, 2016; Brynjolfsson & Oh 2012; Goolsbee & 
Klenow, 2006). 
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seeking to differentiate their products via an improved reputation. Given the noted link 
between online reviews and products’ reputation (and therefore product differentiation, or 
perceived quality), in the present paper we extend the previous research by treating online 
reviews (both average rating as well as volume of reviews) as a dynamic source of 
(vertical) product differentiation among hotels. Specifically, we test to what extent 
hotels’ proximity in (online) reputation is an important determinant of price competition 
in the lodging industry.38To best of the author’s knowledge, the study is the first to 
consider reputation as a multidimensional factor of product differentiation in studying 
spatial price competition. 
3.3. Methodology  
3.3.1. Model specifications  
 
 The aim of this study is to examine the role of three product differentiation 
dimensions (geographical, quality, and reputation) on hotel price competition, and to 
assess whether competition is localized. The empirical approach of this study relies on 
the theory of oligopoly price competition with differentiated products. Specifically, we 
estimate the price reaction function that results from the first order condition of profit-
maximizing firms (e.g. Bresnahan, 1987; Slade, 1986). This equation specifies how a 
firm 𝑖 (in this case a hotel) responds to the prices of the rivals it faces: 
(1)                                             𝑝𝑖 = 𝑎𝑖 +  ∑ 𝑏𝑖𝑗𝑝𝑗𝑖≠𝑗 ,      𝑖 = 1, … , 𝑁 
 
38 This is of particular importance because in competitive and condensed markets in which vertical 
differentiation based on location and product quality is limited (i.e. products are highly substitutable), 
reputation may become a source of differentiation and thus price competition among hotels.  
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Where ai is the intercept of the reaction function, pj is rival j’s price, and bij 
denotes the reaction function slope of firm i’s price with respect to firm j’s price.39 With 
many differentiated firms (in this application we use more than 150 hotels), the bij 
parameters pose an empirical challenge as the number of coefficients to be estimated is 
very large.40  
To deal with the noted dimensionality problem, we adopt the distance metric 
(DM) approach introduced by Pinkse et al. (2002). The solution proposed by Pinkse et al. 
(2002) relies on the assumption that the slope bij is a function of the proximity (in 
product space) between firms i and j. This proximity measure, which we denote as cij, is, 
in turn, defined as an inverse measure of distance between products i and j (in product 
space). For example, one can specify bij to be a linear function of proximity: bij = γcij, 
where cij = 1/dij, dij is the distance (in miles) between hotels i and j, and γ is a 
parameter to be estimated. In this example, the dimensionality of the problem is reduced 
to the estimation of a single parameter (γ), which measures the importance of geographic 
proximity on price competition. As expected from economic theory, price competition 
with differentiated products would predict an upward sloping reaction function (γ > 0). 
In practice, estimation is carried out by specifying (1) in matrix form (for now this 
study omits the error term and the time dimension in the data): 
(1′)                                                                P = A + γWP 
 
39 A greater slope is associated with a greater substitutability (and hence implies a larger cross-price 
elasticity) 
40 Without imposing symmetry, the number of slope parameters is equal to 𝑁 ×  (𝑁 − 1). 
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where 𝑃 and 𝐴 are 𝑁 × 1 vectors and 𝑊 is an 𝑁 × 𝑁 matrix with 𝑖, 𝑗 element 
containing the pairwise proximity measure between hotels 𝑖 and 𝑗 (as described above).41 
With this specification, price of hotel 𝑖 (the dependent variable) is a linear function of the 
weighted price of the hotels that 𝑖 faces in the market, where each weight is given by the 
pairwise proximity between hotels. 
In this study, we apply the DM method to study the role that proximity, along 
three different dimensions in product space, has on hotel competition. One of these 
dimensions is the geographic location of hotels (i.e. proximity is based on the pairwise 
geographic distance between hotels). Another dimension is hotels’ quality rating (also 
known as a hotel’s “scale”). Since a hotel’s quality is measured based on an ordinal scale 
(ranging from 1= “Midscale” to 5= “Luxury” scale, as the highest quality category), the 
corresponding proximity measure is defined as a dichotomous variable: equal to 1 if 
hotels 𝑖 and 𝑗 belong to the same “scale” and zero otherwise. The underlying assumption 
for this definition of proximity (based on hotels’ tier rating) is that competition between 
hotels is confined amongst hotels of the same rating (we later explain how this 
assumption is consistent with industry practice).  Hotel quality ratings are assessed and 
provided by STR, a leading global company that publishes each hotel’s scale. 
The third measure of proximity is also based on a variable that captures quality: 
hotels’ online reputation (obtained from consumers’ online reviews). Since there is 
evidence that suggests that, when assessing a hotel’s reputation, consumers use both a 
hotel’s average online rating (measured on a 1 through 5 star scale) as well as the volume 
of reviews (see section 3.2), we take into account both dimensions of online reputation 
 
41 The diagonal elements of the 𝑊 matrix are zeros. 
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when computing hotels’ proximity measures (section 3.3.2 presents details of this 
calculation). As opposed to hotel tiers, online reputation is a consumer-generated 
measure of quality. In addition, online reputation (volume of reviews and/or average 
rating) differs from a hotel’s tier in that it: a) is continuous variable, and b) changes over 
time as consumers add more reviews and provide a hotel with a rating. 
The empirical approach of this study is designed in a way that it allows for direct 
tests of which of the three product space dimensions (geography, quality or online 
reputation) matter most for price competition. Intuitively, if the slope of the price reaction 
function (i.e. 𝛾 in equation 1) is significantly being driven by geographic proximity, for 
example, this would be interpreted as evidence of geographic proximity being an 
important factor in firms’ pricing decisions. To this end, we first examine the importance 
of each of the three dimensions we consider by estimating separate models, each 
considering a proximity measure based on different product differentiation dimension. 
We then consider richer specifications, which allow the 𝑖, 𝑗 entries in 𝑊 to depend on 
more than one proximity measure. Further, the DM approach allows us to construct 
specifications that assess the extent to which competition is local (versus global). We 
explain all these specifications next. 
Incorporating the time dimension, specifying a functional form for 𝐴, and adding 
an error component (𝜀) to (1’) yields: 
(2)                                                        𝑃 = 𝑋𝛽 + 𝛾𝑊𝑐𝑃 + 𝜀  
where 𝑃 and 𝜀 are (𝑁 × 𝑇) vectors (𝑇 is the number of days in the dataset), and 
𝑊𝑐 is an (𝑁 × 𝑇) × (𝑁 × 𝑇) matrix containing 𝑖, 𝑗 pairwise measures based on proximity 
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measure 𝑐. The 𝑋 matrix, with dimension (𝑁 × 𝑇) × 𝐾, contains 𝐾 variables that capture 
(time-invariant) hotel characteristics, as well as market characteristics (we describe these 
variables in the next section). The econometric tests rely on specifying different 𝑊𝑐 
matrices, which capture different notions of proximity (described in the next paragraphs). 
Note that the product 𝑊𝑐𝑃 is, effectively, a weighted average price of rivals’ prices, 
where the weights are given by the non-zero entries in the corresponding row of the 𝑊𝑐 
matrix. 
Before explaining the different 𝑊𝑐 matrices we consider, it is important to note a 
previously noted advantage of the DM method: the researcher can specify proximity 
measures that capture (and test) competition at a global level or, alternatively, at a more 
localized level.  An example of using the DM method to capture (and test) competition at 
a local level is given by the proximity measure that uses a hotel’s quality tier: hotels 𝑖 and 
𝑗 are given a proximity measure equal to 1 if they belong to the same quality tier, and 
zero otherwise. This measure, by definition, rules out competition between hotels in 
different quality tiers (an assumption that, as we later explain, conforms with practice in 
the industry) thereby constraining competition to exist only locally (e.g. luxury hotels do 
not compete with midscale hotels).  
Conversely, an example of a proximity measure that captures competition at a 
global level is a definition based on the geographic location of hotels: all 𝑖-𝑗 pairs of 
hotels have a non-zero proximity measure (some small, some large), no matter how 
distant they are. Another advantage of the DM method is that one can specify proximity 
measures based on more than one product characteristic (i.e. multidimensional product 
space); with this approach, one defines, for example, product space to have two 
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dimensions (say geography and reputation) and uses hotels’ locations in this two-
dimensional product space to calculate the corresponding proximity measure (i.e. an 
inverse of two-dimensional Euclidean distance; we provide details in section 3.3.2). 
We create several 𝑊𝑐 matrices with the objective of capturing different possible 
drivers of price competition among hotels (Table 8). One dimensional (1-D) matrices use 
one of the three possible product characteristics: geography (G), quality (Q) or reputation 
(R).  The only weighing matrix that we create in 2-D space uses both the geographic and 
the reputation dimensions; this matrix assigns proximity values to each pairwise set of 
hotels based on their (Euclidean) proximity in this 2-D space (see section 3.3.2 for 
computational details). Table 8 also identifies if a weighing matrix captures a notion of 
either global or local competition. As already explained, quality is only used to define a 
localized measure of competition. While geography and reputation are used to create 
global measures of competition, they are also used to create local counterparts; for 
example, matrix 𝑊𝐺
4
 has an entry that takes a value of 1 for hotel 𝑗 if it is one of hotel 𝑖’s 
four closest competitors (see also matrix 𝑊𝑅
4
).  As with 1-D measures, proximity in 2-D 
space is used to create a global measure of competition as well as a local one (i.e. 𝑊𝐺𝑅, 
𝑊𝐺𝑅
4
).  
One reason that prompts us to study and test the hypothesis that price competition 
is local (i.e. limited to a small set of competitors) is based on an institutional fact in this 
industry. All hotels in the sample have a membership with STR; one benefit of this 
membership is that hotels receive, from STR, a monthly report on their “main” 
competitors’ performance. A hotel’s “main” rivals are typically limited to (usually) four 
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competitors; these rivals are (in most cases) identified by the hotel’s manager42 as its core 
competitors and are, usually, defined on the basis of geographic proximity, as well as 
similarity (in quality/scale, size, and age).  
 
Table 8 Weighing Matrices Created, by Product Space Dimension and Type of 
Competition 
 
Product Space Dimension Global Competition Localized Competition 
None: Baseline (product space 
does not matter) 
𝑾𝑵: all 𝑖, 𝑗 entries equal to 1  
One 
Dimensional 
(1-D) 
Geographic 𝑾𝑮: all 𝑖, 𝑗 entries equal to 
inverse of  Euclidean 
distance (1-D) 
𝑾𝑮
𝟒
: 𝑖, 𝑗 entry equal to 1 only if 𝑗 is 
one of 𝑖’s the four closest 
(geographic) competitors (zero 
otherwise)  
Quality  𝑾𝑸: 𝑖, 𝑗 entry equal to 1 only if 𝑗 has 
the same quality rating as 𝑖 (zero 
otherwise) 
Reputation 𝑾𝑹: all 𝑖, 𝑗 entries equal to 
inverse of Euclidean distance 
(1-D) 
𝑾𝑹
𝟒
: 𝑖, 𝑗 entry equal to 1 only if 𝑗 is 
one of 𝑖’s the four closest competitors 
in reputation space (zero otherwise) 
Two-
Dimensional 
(2-D) 
Geographic - 
Reputation 
𝑾𝑮𝑹: all 𝑖, 𝑗 entries equal to 
inverse of  Euclidean 
distance (2-D) 
𝑾𝑮𝑹
𝟒
: 𝑖, 𝑗 entry equal to 1 only if 𝑗 is 
one of 𝑖’s the four closest competitors 
in GR space (zero otherwise) 
Note: in all cases diagonal elements of the weighing matrix are equal to zero. 
 
Finally, Table 8 also considers a baseline matrix (𝑊𝑁), which assumes that 
competition is: a) global, and b) that hotels’ proximity in product space does not matter at 
all (all rivals’ prices are weighed equally). This matrix is useful in the empirical analysis 
of this study since it helps to quantify (via the additional improvement in model fit, 
achieved by specifications that do allow for product differentiation) the importance that 
proximity has on competition. 
 
42 This group of hotels is called the “competitive set”. The competitive set is defined by including hotels 
that are nearby, belong to the same hotel scale, and/or are similar in characteristics (such as size and age). 
While hotel managers have some discretion as to which hotels are its main competitors, STR has certain 
rules that need to be followed by managers in identifying the competitive set (when these rules are not met, 
STR asks the hotel to modify the set so that it conforms with STR’s rules). 
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Table 9 describes the 𝑊𝑐 matrices that are taken to estimation. For ease of 
exposition, this study groups the created matrices by the number of product 
characteristics used in creating the corresponding proximity measures in each weighing 
matrix. Note that several of the matrices in Table 9 are the result of combining (through 
element-by-element multiplication) two or three of the matrices defined in Table 8. 
Consequently, matrices in Table 8 are a subset of the matrices in Table 9. Combining 
matrices in this way allows us to capture and test richer (more complex) aspects of 
competition.  
 
Table 9 Weighing Matrices Used in Estimation, by Number of Product 
Characteristics Used 
 
# Product Space Characteristics Used 
None One Two Three 
𝑾𝑵 
𝑾𝑮 
𝑾𝑹 
𝑾𝑸 
𝑾𝑮
𝟒
 
𝑾𝑹
𝟒
 
𝑾𝑮−𝑮
𝟒
=  𝑊𝐺  ∙  𝑊𝐺
4
 
𝑾𝑹−𝑹
𝟒
=  𝑊𝑅  ∙  𝑊𝑅
4
 
 𝑾𝑮𝑹 
𝑾𝑮𝑹
𝟒
 
𝑾𝑮𝑹−𝑮𝑹
𝟒
=  𝑊𝐺𝑅 ∙  𝑊𝐺𝑅
4
 
𝑾𝑮−𝑸 =  𝑊𝐺  ∙  𝑊𝑄  
𝑾𝑮
𝟒−𝑸 =   𝑊𝐺
4
∙ 𝑊𝑄 
𝑾𝑮−𝑮
𝟒−𝑸 =  𝑊𝐺 ∙  𝑊𝐺
4
∙  𝑊𝑄 
𝑾𝑹−𝑸 =  𝑊𝑅  ∙  𝑊𝑄 
𝑾𝑹
𝟒−𝑸 =  𝑊𝑅
4
 ∙  𝑊𝑄 
𝑾𝑹−𝑹
𝟒−𝑸 =  𝑊𝑅 ∙  𝑊𝑅
4
∙  𝑊𝑄  
𝑾𝑮𝑹−𝑸 =  𝑊𝐺𝑅 ∙   𝑊𝑄 
𝑾𝑮𝑹
𝟒−𝑸 =  𝑊𝐺𝑅
4
∙  𝑊𝑄 
𝑾𝑮𝑹−𝑮𝑹
𝟒−𝑸 =  𝑊𝐺𝑅
∙  𝑊𝐺𝑅
4
∙  𝑊𝑄  
Note: the “∙” operator refers to the element-by-element matrix product.  
 
For example, 𝑊𝐺−𝐺
4
 is obtained by combining 𝑊𝐺  (a matrix capturing global 
competition based on hotels’ geographic pairwise proximity) and 𝑊𝐺
4
 (a matrix 
capturing local competition - based on hotels’ geographic proximity); when combined, 
𝑊𝐺  and 𝑊𝐺
4
 (both generated using the same product characteristic, 𝑮), produce a matrix 
that has non-zero entries for the 4 closest rivals (in geographic space) with non-zero 
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entries corresponding to pairwise geographic proximity measures. This combined matrix 
allows us to test for richer drivers of price competition: a) with respect to 𝑊𝐺 , 𝑊𝐺−𝐺
4
 
tests whether localized competition (among the 4 closest rivals) may be more important 
than global competition, and b) with respect to 𝑊𝐺
4
, 𝑊𝐺−𝐺
4
 tests whether, conditional 
on being one of the four closest rivals, geographical proximity matters. 
The empirical approach is to estimate separate models for each of the weighing 
matrices in Table 8, starting with weighing matrices that use only one product space 
characteristic to define proximity. This approach allows us to gauge the explanatory 
power of each product space dimension (either in isolation or jointly) in hotels’ pricing 
decisions. To this end, this study uses the first weighing matrix (𝑊𝑁, a “naïve” model 
since it treats prices of all rival hotels equally) to obtain a benchmark to which other 
models can be compared against. As more product space characteristics are added to 
compute proximity measures (or a variant that tests local competition versus global 
competition), this study can gauge whether the added product space characteristic (or 
local competition) brings in additional explanatory power (and can therefore better 
explain price competition among hotels). More generally, moving from two product 
characteristics and/or combining multiple weighing matrices, allows us to test for more 
complex and/or more localized mechanisms of competition (as already explained). 
3.3.2. Data and distance measures 
 
 This study uses a database consisting of 161 hotels in the Manhattan district in 
New York City, with an aggregate room capacity of 63,572, comprising approximately 
79% of the hotel room supply in this district. The Manhattan area is an interesting 
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location to study hotel competition since it comprises numerous points of interest, spread 
out across the district, that are sought out by both business travelers and tourists; thus, in 
this market, one can say that customers’ preferences are spatially distributed, as required 
by several models of product differentiation.  
This study uses the daily average price (ADR), over the January 2013 to July 
2015 period (926 days), as the dependent variable; the data is provided by STR, a firm 
that collects data from almost all hotels in Manhattan. STR also provides, among other 
variables, each hotel’s scale (tier). The data provided by ADR was anonymized. This 
study was able to (separately) collect information on hotels’ geographic location and 
online reputation. With these data (geographic location, tier and online reputation) this 
study proceeds to compute the weighing matrices.43 
First, this study obtains information on each hotel’s geographical location 
(latitude and longitude) and compute the corresponding Euclidean distances all pairs of 
hotels (𝑑𝑖𝑗).
44 Finally, the corresponding proximity measure (which is used as the weight 
between hotels 𝑖 and 𝑗) will be computed as the inverse of the Euclidean distance (i.e. 
𝑐𝑖𝑗 = 1/𝑑𝑖𝑗). Second, this study uses STR’s hotel scale (tier); with this variable, STR 
categorizes hotels based on their quality levels into five different classes: midscale, 
upper-mid scale, upscale, upper-upscale, and luxury. 45 This scale variable is used to 
create the corresponding proximity (weighing) matrix 𝑊𝑄 (see section 3.3.2).  Third, this 
study uses online customer review data for all hotels in the sample to compute proximity 
 
43 To preserve STR’s rules of hotel anonymity, the analysis does not reveal any identifiable information. 
44 𝑑𝑖𝑗 =  √(𝐿𝑎𝑡𝑖 − 𝐿𝑎𝑡𝑗)2 + (𝐿𝑜𝑛𝑖 − 𝐿𝑜𝑛𝑗)2. 
45 The lowest hotel is scale is “economy”. However, in the Manhattan market, this segment is nearly non-
existent (2 hotels). For this reason, this study excludes this category from the analysis. 
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measures in online reputation (matrix 𝑊𝑅, see section 3.3.2). The data was scraped from 
TripAdvisor’s webpage covering all the reviews posted during January 2003 and July 
2015 period. Using this procedure, more than 314,000 reviews were obtained for the 
hotels in the sample.  
TripAdvisor was founded in 2000 and it is the world largest crowd-sourced 
feedback platform in the travel industry. TripAdvisor allows hotel visitors to write textual 
reviews and give numerical star-ratings (ranging from 1 to 5 stars) to hotels. Conversely, 
the platform enables potential hotel visitors to customize the available hotels to be 
displayed based on some attributes of interest including location, quality level, and value; 
once these criteria are entered, potential customers observe, among other things, the 
number of reviews as well as the average star-rating of the hotels. As indicated earlier, 
since consumers are likely to care about average quality as well as volume of reviews 
(see section 3.2.2), this study accounts for both of these measures as determinants of 
hotels’ online reputation. The cumulative number of reviews is denoted as 𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡, and the 
average of reviews ratings as 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑡. While these measures correspond to the period 
under study (January 2013 to July 2015), their computation is based on data collected 
prior to this time span46; this allows us to take into account the existent online reputation 
of hotels as of the start of the dataset.  
To include both measures of online reputation (volume and average rating) in the 
pairwise proximity calculation, this study follows Pinkse & Slade’s (2004) approach and 
compute the Euclidean distance between hotels, using the two online reputation measures 
 
46 Since data was scraped starting in January, 2003, hotels’ volume and reputation measures as of January 
2013 (the start of the period of analysis) were computed using data from January 2003 until December of 
2012.  
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as dimensions of the Euclidean space.47  Specifically, the online reputation proximity 
matrix (𝑊𝑅) will be populated with the inverse of the following Euclidean distance: 
𝑅𝑖𝑗𝑡 =  √(𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡 − 𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑗𝑡)2 + (𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑡 − 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑗𝑡)2, where 𝑖, 𝑗 = 1, . . , 𝑁, and 𝑡 =
1, … , 𝑇. Finally, this study populates the 𝑊𝐺𝑅 matrix with pairwise proximity elements 
equal to the inverse of the 2-D (geographical and reputation dimensions) Euclidean 
distance given by 𝐺𝑅𝑖𝑗𝑡 =  √(𝑑𝑖𝑗)2 + (𝑅𝑖𝑗𝑡)2.
48 
3.3.3. Other explanatory variables 
 
The X matrix in equation 2 includes a variety of fixed effects. To control for 
weekly and monthly demand cyclicality, this study includes dummy variables for the 
days of the week as well as months of the year. Also, to control for (time-invariant) 
unobserved heterogeneity among hotels, dummy variables for each hotels were included 
in the estimation. This study also experiments with specifications that in lieu of hotel 
fixed effects included a number of time-invariant hotel characteristics to test the results 
remain unchanged.49 
 
 
 
47  Prior to computing the Euclidean distance, this study normalizes volume and rating distance measures so 
that they lie in the [0,1] interval. Normalization is conducted by subtracting the minimum and dividing the 
result by the range (max – min) of the distance measures (since reputation measures vary over time, this is 
done at each time t). 
48 As with elements 𝑅𝑖𝑗𝑡, 𝐺𝑅𝑖𝑗𝑡  distances are computed by first normalizing the distance variables (using 
geographic location, volume, and average rating) that are used for the computation (i.e. 𝑑𝑖𝑗  and  𝑅𝑖𝑗𝑡). 
49 These characteristics included hotel quality, size (number of rooms), chain affiliation (e.g. Marriot, etc.), 
and operation type (e.g. franchised, chain management, or independently-run). This study also included 
market structure controls such as the concentration ratio within each hotel class (CR4), number of rivals in 
the market, and a hotel’s rivals’ capacity (four largest competitors) . Finally, dummy variables were 
included to control for systematic (time-invariant) differences in market conditions across the five 
Manhattan districts that STR considers for this market. 
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3.3.4. Model estimation 
 
 This study first estimates the model using ordinary least squares, and report 
clustered standard errors. To deal with a possible endogeneity bias, an instrumental 
variable approach is employed. The study constructs a price instrument based on the 
assumption that hotels’ compete in a localized fashion with each other (an assumption 
that was later confirmed in the regressions). To fix ideas, the empirical results (that will 
be explained later  in detail) indicate that a hotel’s price reaction seems to be limited to 
the prices of its four nearest rivals. Thus, to instrument for the price of hotel z (an 
explanatory variable) when hotel y decides its price (the dependent variable), this study 
uses the prices of other hotels that meet two conditions: a) are sufficiently distant from y 
such that these hotels are not one of the four closest competitors of y, and b) are one of 
the four nearest competitors of z (excluding y).  The instrument for the price of hotel z is 
calculated as the average price across hotels that meet the two criteria above.50   
Note that the instrument for the price of hotel z varies depending on which hotel is 
being considered in the dependent variable (depending on the exact geographic, 
reputational, and/or quality position of hotels, the instrument for hotel z may be different 
if the dependent variable is the price of hotel y or if it is the price of hotel m).  Intuitively, 
as long as market conditions (i.e. demand and supply) in the set of hotels chosen to 
construct instrument for hotel z are unrelated to unobserved market conditions in the 
market being instrumented for (hotel y), the instrument would satisfy the required 
orthogonality condition. Further, the condition that the instrument be correlated with the 
 
50 The distance criterion used for the construction of the IV varies depending on which weighing matrix and 
dimension (Q, R or G) is being considered. 
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instrumented variable (the easier of the two requirements for an IV to be valid) is 
satisfied since this study hypothesizes that a hotel’s pricing strategies react to those of the 
nearest rivals: if z’s rivals react to the prices of their nearest competitors, and z reacts to 
its rival’s prices, then the instrument must be correlated with the instrumented variable. 51 
A similar IV approach is employed by Li et al. (2017), who rely on the idea of 
using local demand shocks (measured by the intensity of consumers’ online search 
activity) in one area of New York City to instrument for prices in another part of the city; 
again, the idea being that prices of hotels in sufficiently distant areas of the city are 
correlated with the prices one wants to instrument for because there is a domino effect of 
sorts, and not (necessarily) because the two areas face the same demand shocks (or 
because hotels in the two areas are direct competitors). Clearly, the identifying 
assumption of this instrument relies on the researcher’s ability to account for common 
market shocks (unobservables) that might affect hotels’ pricing across the board; obvious 
candidates for these effects are city-wide market (i.e. demand) shocks; the inclusion of 
day-of-the-week and month-of-the-year dummies alleviates a concern of an endogeneity 
bias due to widespread market shocks. 
3.4. Results 
 
 Table 10 reports the descriptive statistics of the variables used in the analysis.52  
While hotels in Manhattan are expensive (average near $300), there is a large variance 
(SD: $145), suggesting the presence of strong demand fluctuations throughout the year 
(min: $30).  A reason that Manhattan is a pricey hotel area is that many hotels are in the 
 
51 This condition will be tested in the first stage results of the regressions.  
52 Correlation coefficients among independent variables are reported in Appendix 5. 
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higher quality tiers (Luxury 21%, Upper-upscale 28% and Upscale 33%). The most hotel-
populated district is Midtown-South, with 37% of hotels located in that area; the least 
hotel-populated is the Financial district (6.7%). While weighted prices display similar 
average figures, they do differ in their range (and, thus, in their SD), consistent with the 
idea that the different weighing matrices respond to different hypotheses regarding the 
determinants of price competition in the industry. 
Tables 11, 12, and 13 display OLS results. Table 14 reports IV results. Each 
column in a table reports the estimated coefficient on the variable of interest (the 
interaction of the weighing matrix and the price vector – see equation 2). Table 11 
contains results of regressions that only use one product characteristic to construct 
pairwise proximity measures between products, whereas Tables 12 and 13 display results 
of weighing matrices that use, respectively, two and three product characteristics (see 
Tables 8 and 9 for details on these matrices). Table 14 shows results of specifications 
with the greatest explanatory power.  
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Table 10 Summary Statistics 
 
Variable # Obs. Mean  SD Min Max 
Average daily rate (price, 
$/room) 135,309 294.98 145.39 30 3,869 
Review volume (number of 
reviews) 126,387 1,148 1,018 1 6,772 
Reviews average rating 
(cumulative)  126,387 4.15 0.338 1 5 
Hotel Size (number of rooms) 135,309 374 318 97 1,966 
Number of rival hotels (within 
same scale) 135,309 29.86 8.638 3 38 
Luxury 135,309 0.212 0.409 0 1 
Upper-upscale 135,309 0.284 0.451 0 1 
Upscale 135,309 0.327 0.469 0 1 
Upper-mid Scale 135,309 0.151 0.359 0 1 
Mid-Scale 135,309 0.024 0.154 0 1 
Midtown-west district 135,309 0.267 0.442 0 1 
Midtown-south district 135,309 0.370 0.483 0 1 
Midtown-east district 135,309 0.115 0.319 0 1 
Financial District 135,309 0.067 0.249 0 1 
Village/Soho/Tribeca district 135,309 0.182 0.386 0 1 
Weighing Matrices x Average 
Prices: 135,309 294.98 145.38 30 3,869.25 
𝑾𝑵  ×  𝑷 135,309 293.16 58.09 192.6 515.06 
𝑾𝑮  ×  𝑷 135,309 286.29 63.04 136.8 771.05 
𝑾𝑹  ×  𝑷 126,386 299.88 62.14 145.8 897.69 
𝑾𝑸  ×  𝑷 135,309 290.54 102.66 30 756.08 
𝑾𝑮
𝟒
 ×  𝑷 135,309 284.93 102.70 61.5 1,564.32 
𝑾𝑹
𝟒
 ×  𝑷 126,386 300.01 106.69 101.4 1,711.78 
𝑾𝑮−𝑮
𝟒
 ×  𝑷 135,309 285.92 108.52 61.5 1,727.66 
𝑾𝑹−𝑹
𝟒
 ×  𝑷 126,386 297.99 107.83 96.05 1,739.92 
𝑾𝑮𝑹  ×  𝑷 126,386 297.31 60.98 178.2 678.62 
𝑾𝑮𝑹
𝟒
 ×  𝑷 126,386 300.63 133.16 99.67 1,711.78 
𝑾𝑮𝑹−𝑮𝑹
𝟒
 ×  𝑷 126,386 301.72 136.79 84.08 1,881.39 
𝑾𝑮−𝑸  ×  𝑷 135,309 293.42 113.98 30 1,237.52 
𝑾𝑮
𝟒−𝑸  ×  𝑷 135,309 295.22 133.26 30 1,653.53 
𝑾𝑮−𝑮
𝟒−𝑸  ×  𝑷 135,309 293.95 135.92 30 1,690.15 
𝑾𝑹−𝑸  ×  𝑷 126,386 304.22 116.74 91.34 1,082.92 
𝑾𝑮𝑹−𝑸  ×  𝑷 126,386 303.67 133.41 101.45 1,616.40 
𝑾𝑮𝑹
𝟒−𝑸  ×  𝑷 126,386 304.91 137.98 91.34 2,082.77 
𝑾𝑮𝑹−𝑮𝑹
𝟒−𝑸  ×  𝑷 126,386 304.42 119.39 104.21 1,196.15 
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As noted earlier, all regressions in Tables 11 through 14 contain day, month, and 
hotel fixed effects; standard errors are clustered at the hotel level.53 Thus, the only 
difference across specifications is the specific weighing matrix (proximity definition) 
used. 
To compare across different specifications and establish whether a particular 
proximity measure is superior to another in explaining price reaction functions (and 
therefore price competition), this study uses the fitness-of-model measure 𝑅2. This 
measure is used instead of the magnitude of the estimated coefficient (𝛾), because 
comparison of magnitudes of the coefficient across specifications is not straightforward.54 
Model comparison using this procedure is intuitive: if a particular proximity measure has 
a superior model fit, it means that (ceteris paribus), it is explaining a larger portion of the 
variance exhibited by (and is hence a better predictor of) the dependent variable. 
 
53 Results remain unchanged when clustering is carried out at the district level (see Appendix 7). 
54 To note this, consider the 𝑊𝐺  and 𝑊𝐺−𝐺
4
 matrices. A row in the 𝑊𝐺  matrix has all but one non-zero 
element, effectively producing a weighted average of rivals’ prices across all hotels in the corresponding 
entry of the  𝑊𝐺 × 𝑃 element.  Conversely, 𝑊𝐺−𝐺
4
 uses the same weights (proximity measures) as 𝑊𝐺 , but 
has only 4 non-zero elements, yielding a weighted average of rivals that has a different scale than that of 
𝑊𝐺−𝐺
4
. 
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Table 11 One-Dimensional Space Regressions (OLS) 
 
Weight matrix: 𝑾𝑵 
(naïve model) 
𝑾𝑮 
 
𝑾𝑹 
 
𝑾𝑸 
 
𝑾𝑮
𝟒
 
 
𝑾𝑹
𝟒
 
 
𝑾𝑮−𝑮
𝟒
 𝑾𝑹−𝑹
𝟒
 
Estimated 
Coefficient (𝛾) 
0.996*** 
(0.022) 
1.050*** 
(0.031) 
0.910*** 
(0.032) 
0.949*** 
(0.035) 
0.829*** 
(0.040) 
0.338*** 
(0.039) 
0.798*** 
(0.042) 
0.310*** 
(0.037) 
𝑅2 0.161 0.325 0.215 0.490 0.508 0.263 0.511 0.248 
𝑁 135,308 135,308 126,386 135,284 135,308 126,386 135,308 126,386 
Notes: ***P<0.001; **p<0.01; *p<0.0555. Clustered standard errors in parentheses; cluster: hotel.  
 
Table 12 Two-Dimensional Space Regressions (OLS) 
 
Weight matrix: 𝑾𝑮𝑹 𝑾𝑮𝑹
𝟒
 𝑾𝑮𝑹−𝑮𝑹
𝟒
 𝑾
𝑮−𝑸 𝑾𝑮
𝟒−𝑸 𝑾𝑮−𝑮
𝟒−𝑸 𝑾
𝑹−𝑸 𝑾𝑹
𝟒−𝑸 𝑾𝑹−𝑹
𝟒−𝑸 
Estimated Coefficient 
(𝛾) 
1.015*** 
(0.029) 
0.549*** 
(0.069) 
0.555*** 
(0.069) 
0.942*** 
(0.033) 
0.909*** 
(0.021) 
0.892*** 
(0.020) 
0.880*** 
(0.045) 
0.616*** 
(0.052) 
0.576*** 
(0.052) 
𝑅2 0.291 0.512 0.544 0.675 0.741 0.756  0.581 0.611 0.605 
𝑁 126,386 126,386 126,386 135,284 134,486 134,486 126,365 126,365 126,365 
Notes: see table 11. 
 
 
 
 
 
55 In all regressions (tables 11-14), day, month, and hotel fixed effects are included. The reasons for the differing number of observations across 
specifications is that STR data includes 161 hotels but online (TripAdvisor) review data only includes 154 hotels (specifications that include online 
reputation have fewer observations). 
 
 
 
80 
 
 
Table 13 Three-Dimensional Space Regressions (OLS) 
 
Weight matrix 𝑾𝑮𝑹−𝑸 𝑾𝑮𝑹
𝟒−𝑸 𝑾𝑮𝑹−𝑮𝑹
𝟒−𝑸 
Estimated 
Coefficient (𝛾) 
0.968*** 
(0.035) 
0.766*** 
(0.034) 
0.757*** 
(0.035) 
𝑅2 0.687 0.744 0.749 
𝑁 126,365 126,365 126,365 
                                                        Notes: see table 11. 
Table 14 IV Regressions56 
 
Weight matrix 𝑾𝑮
𝟒
 𝑾𝑮−𝑮
𝟒
 𝑾𝑮𝑹−𝑮𝑹
𝟒
 𝑾𝑮
𝟒−𝑸 𝑾𝑮−𝑮
𝟒−𝑸 𝑾𝑹−𝑹
𝟒−𝑸 𝑾𝑮𝑹
𝟒−𝑸 𝑾𝑮𝑹−𝑮𝑹
𝟒−𝑸 
Estimated 
Coefficient (𝛾) 
1.431*** 
(0.111) 
1.204*** 
(0.075) 
0.894*** 
(0.131) 
0.925*** 
(0.042) 
0.942*** 
(0.042) 
1.185*** 
(0.098) 
1.334***(0
.092) 
1.075 *** 
(0.0700) 
𝑅2 0.606 0.515 0.601 0.746 0.764 0.601 0.738 0.757 
𝑁 121,130 108,544 117,736 124,327 124,327 108,544 121,130 109,493 
                   Notes: see table 11. 
 
 
 
56 Some IV regressions contain fewer observations than OLS regressions because (for a few hotels) it is not feasible to generate a price instrument using 
the introduced procedure (the procedure requires that, for a given hotel’s, it is observes there exist rivals’ rivals prices that meet the IV criterion; 
sometimes this is not possible). 
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To make model comparisons more straightforward, this study utilizes the “naïve” 
model (𝑊𝑁) as a benchmark; in principle, since proximity plays no role in the definition 
of entries in 𝑊𝑁, any improvement in model fit achieved by a different weighing matrix 
must be due to the importance of the corresponding proximity measure associated with 
this weighing matrix. With this procedure, this study proceeds to analyze the regression 
results in Tables 11 through 14, with the objective of determining which product 
characteristic is most important in explaining competition and whether there is support 
for the notion of localized competition 
Focusing first on results from Table 11, the following conclusions can be reached. 
First, of the three dimensions considered in this study (𝐺, 𝑅, 𝑄), similarity in hotels 
quality (𝑄), seems to matter most for price competition (𝑅2 of 0.559 v. 0.161 from the 
naïve model).  The second most important dimension appears to be geographic (𝑅2 of 
0.325), whereas proximity on online reputation ads relatively little explanatory power 
over the naïve model (𝑅2 of 0.215).  
Second, this study observes that localized competition is very important in this 
market. There are several reasons that justify this conclusion. Proximity of hotels along 
the 𝑄 dimension (the one with the most explanatory power) is, by definition, a measure 
of localized competition (proximity of hotels in the same scale is 1 and zero otherwise). 
Further, when the other two dimensions (𝐺 and 𝑅) are used to create measures of 
localized competition (e.g. four closest competitors in 𝐺 or 𝑅 spaces), their explanatory 
power increases. This is particularly evident for the 𝐺 dimension: both 𝑊𝐺
4
 and 𝑊𝐺−𝐺
4
 
have much larger explanatory power than 𝑊𝐺 . While something similar can be said for 
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the 𝑅 dimension, the added explanatory power that localized competition in the 𝑅 
dimension brings seems to be, in comparison, only marginal. 
The conclusions this study reaches using the results in Table 12 are consistent 
with what was observed in Table 11: a) model fit is best when the quality dimension is 
included to calculate pairwise proximity across hotels (regressions 4 through 9 in Table 
12, which include 𝑄, have the highest model fit), b) geographic proximity matters, but 
mostly when it is used to determine the four closest rivals (model fit is highest for 𝑊𝐺
4−𝑄 
and 𝑊𝐺−𝐺
4−𝑄), and c) online reputation seems to add relatively little explanatory power 
(the highest model fits are reached when 𝑅 is excluded as a dimension for computing 
pairwise hotel proximity). 
The results in Table 13 indicate that the inclusion of all three product 
characteristics in order to explain price competition may not be necessary as the model fit 
in these specifications is not superior to the best model fit in Table 12 (achieved when 
using only 𝐺 and 𝑄: 𝑊𝐺−𝐺
4−𝑄). This is not surprising given what it is known from 
Tables 11 and 12: proximity of hotels on the online reputation dimension appears to 
contribute only marginally to explaining price competition in this industry (i.e. hotels’ 
similarity in quality and geography may be sufficient to explain the drivers of price 
competition in this industry).  
Finally, IV results (displayed in Table 14) confirm the conclusions that this study 
reaches with the OLS results. Importantly, the results indicate that the IV approach 
produces the expected theoretical result: the price reaction coefficient (𝛾) becomes 
steeper compared with what it is obtained when the OLS counterpart is employed; these 
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results not only confirm that the proposed IV works well in correcting the endogeneity 
bias, but that the OLS conclusions remain unchanged despite of such bias. 
 
3.5. Discussion and Conclusion 
 
Focusing on one of the largest lodging markets in the world (Manhattan, New York), this 
study attempts to show that to what extent hotels’ proximity in geographic and attribute 
(quality and reputation) spaces plays a role on price competition. Finding of this study 
reveals evidence on the most important drivers of price competition. Further, the results 
will shed some light in understanding whether competition in this industry is (highly) 
localized: hotels’ prices react most aggressively to prices set by the a few nearest hotels 
in the area, and whether the effect gets compounded if the nearest hotels are hotels of the 
same quality tier.   
Of particular interest of this study, evidence was found on extent to which 
proximity in (online) reputation has explanatory power in the pricing decisions of hotels, 
although it is much less important than geography or quality. In other words, due to 
ubiquitous role of customer reviews in influencing firms’ demand, the findings suggest 
that there might be opportunities for hotel managers to improve their profitability through 
their dynamic pricing decisions. Specifically, since reaction functions (the theoretical 
construct upon which this study builds the empirical strategy) should represent optimal 
behavior, the estimated coefficient on such reaction function (when using online 
reputation proximity) may be capturing a flatter than optimal reaction.  While an answer 
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to this hypothesis lies beyond the scope of this paper, it is a question that is worth 
pursuing in future research. 
While the reported evidence of localized competition in the lodging industry 
among the noted product differentiation dimensions is compelling, it displays both 
limitations as well as opportunities for future research. While studying the Manhattan 
hotel market may seem to limit the scope and generalizability of the current research, the 
ubiquity of online reviews across industries provides interesting and timely opportunities 
to investigate the role of time-varying product attributes in price competition models 
particularly in industries where revenue management (e.g. daily pricing) is a common 
practice. Another limitation of this research is that, while price competition for room 
prices is studied, hotels may also compete (generate revenue) along other dimensions 
(amenities) such as restaurants, casinos, clubs, meeting space, etc.; availability of all-
inclusive revenue data, not currently at the disposal of researchers, would make this type 
of research possible. 
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APPENDIX 1 
THE EFFECT OF HOTEL RESPONSIVNESS ON CUSTOMER REVIEW 
RATINGS (OLS) 
 
Dependent variable:  
av. review ratings (log) 
Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) 
 
Responsiveness(t) 
 
0.001(0.006) 0.008(0.009) -0.001(0.006) 
Responsiveness(t) × Branded 
hotel 
 
 -0.013(0.010)  
Responsiveness(t) × 
Experienced hotel 
 
  0.0005***(9.5E-5) 
# Negative reviews(t) -0.007***(0.0008) -0.007***(0.0007) -0.007***(0.0008) 
# Positive reviews(t) 0.001***(8.9E-5) 0.001***(8.9E-5) 0.001***(9.1E-5) 
Cumulative # reviews(t) -3.4E-5***(6.79E-6) -3.4E-5***(6.79E-6) -4.9E-5***(7.9E-5) 
Average ratings(t-1) 0.164***(0.028) 0.165***(0.028) 0.162***(0.028) 
Peers’ average rating (t) 0.013†(0.007) 0.013† (0.007) 0.013† (0.007) 
 
Season fixed effects 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Hotel fixed effect Yes Yes Yes 
# of cluster(hotel) 320 299 320 
Observations 4201 4193 4201 
𝑅2 0.47 0.47 0.43 
Note: The dependent variable is the log of average of customer review rating. Only observations 
with non-zero values of responsive peers are included. Cluster heteroskedasticity robust standard 
errors in parentheses. † p < 0.1; * p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001.  
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APPENDIX 2 
THE EFFECT OF HOTEL RESPONSIVENESS ON CUSTOMER REVIEW 
RATINGS IN EARLIER AND LATER YEARS 
 
 2007-2009 2012-2014 
Responsiveness(t) -0.423(1.217) 0.084(0.057) 
# Negative reviews(t) -0.025†(0.0002) -0.005***(0.0008) 
# Positive reviews(t) 0.005(0.006) 0.0006(0.0002) 
Cumulative # reviews(t) -0.0001(0.0002) -3.8E-6(9.6E-6) 
Average ratings(t-1) -1.974(4.340) 0.681(0.514) 
Peers’ average rating (t) -0.061(0.174) 0.010(0.009) 
Season fixed effects Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes 
Hotel fixed effects Yes Yes 
# of cluster(hotel) 132 310 
Observations 570 3104 
𝑅2 0.15 0.61 
Note: see the table in Appendix 1.   
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 APPENDIX 3 
THE EFFECT OF EXPREICNED HOTELS’ RESPONSIVNESS ON CUSTOMER 
REVIEW RATINGS; BRNADED VERSUS INDEPENDENT HOTELS  
 
 Chain (branded)  Independent 
Responsiveness(t) 
 
0.052†(0.031) 0.151†(0.089) 
Responsiveness(t) × 
Experienced hotel(t) 
 
0.017†(0.008) -0.003(0.025) 
# Negative reviews(t) -0.007**(0.0007) -0.005***(0.001) 
# Positive reviews(t) 0.0006***(0.0001) 0.0008**(0.0002) 
Cumulative # reviews(t) -2.20E-5**(7.7E-6) -3.9E-5*(1.8E-5) 
Average ratings(t-1) 0.711***(0.197) 0.401(0.372) 
Peers’ average rating (t) 0.014(0.009) 0.015(0.011) 
 
Season fixed effects 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes 
Hotel fixed effect Yes Yes 
# of cluster(hotel) 142 173 
Observations 2037 2158 
𝑅2 0.54 0.38 
Note: see the table Appendix 1.  
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APPENDIX 4 
THE EFFECT OF HOTEL RESPONSIVNESS ON CUSTOMER REVIEW 
RATINGS; REPUTED VERUSUS NON-REPUTED HOTELS 
 
 Reputed Not-reputed  
Responsiveness(t) 0.098*(0.048) 0.126*(0.061) 
# Negative reviews(t) -0.004***(0.0005) -0.013***(0.002) 
# Positive reviews(t) 0.0005***(8.9E-5) 0.001***(0.0005) 
Cumulative # reviews(t) -6.9E-5***(1.4E-5) -0.0002**(8.4E-5) 
Cumulative # reviews(t)squared 8.5E-9***(2.0E-9) 8.5E-6*(3.7E-7) 
Average ratings(t-1) 0.798***(0.144) 0.389(0.409) 
Peers’ average rating (t) 0.013(0.009) 0.011(0.011) 
 
Season fixed effects 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes 
Hotel fixed effect Yes Yes 
# of cluster(hotel) 137 247 
Observations 1875 2323 
𝑅2 0.66 0.35 
Note: see the table Appendix 1.  
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APPENDIX 5 
 CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS AMONG IDEPENDENT VARIABLES 
 
 
 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 
1 Average daily 
rate (price) 
1              
2 Review volume -0.071 1             
3 Reviews avg 
rating (cum)  
0.300 -0.064 1            
4 Hotel Size -0.049 0.605 -0.352 1           
5 Number of rivals 
(within class) 
0.068 0.008 0.013 0.100 1          
6 Luxury 0.565 -0.029 0.213 -0.034 0.010 1         
7 Upper-up Scale -0.078 0.184 -0.068 0.260 0.492 -0.370 1        
8 Upscale -0.263 -0.11 -0.098 -0.152 0.108 -0.390 -0.421 1       
9 Upper-mid Scale -0.229 -0.088 -0.074 -0.100 -0.642 -0.233 -0.251 -0.265 1      
10 Mid-Scale -0.087 0.084 0.063 0.016 -0.445 -0.074 -0.080 -0.085 -0.051 1     
11 Midtown-west 
district 
0.091 0.316 -0.078 0.409 -0.045 -0.013 0.013 -0.044 0.035 0.061 1    
12 Midtown-south 
district 
-0.213 -0.201 0.176 -0.370 -0.139 -0.278 -0.069 0.215 0.144 0.029 -0.500 1   
13 Midtown-east 
district 
0.157 0.132 -0.166 0.261 0.194 0.118 0.125 -0.106 -0.154 -0.049 -0.243 -0.310 1  
14 Financial District 0.000 -0.051 0.076 -0.018 0.070 0.192 0.011 -0.140 -0.059 -0.030 -0.146 -0.186 -0.091 1 
15 Village/Soho/Tri
beca district 
0.027 -0.218 -0.032 -0.249 0.020 0.168 -0.049 -0.052 -0.060 -0.053 -0.260 -0.330 -0.161 -0.097 
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APPENDIX 6 
REGRESSIONS USING TIME-INVARIATE VARIABLES INSTEAD OF HOTEL FIXED EFFECTS 
 
One-Dimensional Space Regressions (OLS)  
Weight matrix: 𝑾𝑵 
(naïve model) 
𝑾𝑮 
 
𝑾𝑹 
 
𝑾𝑸 
 
𝑾𝑮
𝟒
 
 
𝑾𝑹
𝟒
 
 
𝑾𝑮−𝑮
𝟒
 𝑾𝑹−𝑹
𝟒
 
Estimated 
Coefficient (𝛾) 
0.995*** 
(0.022) 
1.314*** 
(0.168) 
1.109*** 
(0.116) 
0.759*** 
(0.040) 
0.750*** 
(0.138) 
0.518*** 
(0.111) 
0.695*** 
(0.139) 
0.484*** 
(0.106) 
𝑅2 0.570 0.639 0.597 0.563 0.706 0.615 0.708 0.605 
𝑁 135,309 135,308 126,386 135,284 135,308 126,386 135,308 126,386 
               Note: ***P<0.001; **p<0.01; *p<0.05. Clustered standard errors in parentheses; cluster: hotel 
 
Two-dimensional Space Regressions (OLS)  
Weight matrix: 𝑾𝑮𝑹 𝑾𝑮𝑹
𝟒
 𝑾𝑮𝑹−𝑮𝑹
𝟒
 𝑾
𝑮−𝑸 𝑾𝑮
𝟒−𝑸 𝑾𝑮−𝑮
𝟒−𝑸 𝑾
𝑹−𝑸 𝑾𝑹
𝟒−𝑸 𝑾𝑹−𝑹
𝟒−𝑸 
Estimated Coefficient 
(𝛾) 
1.466*** 
(0.161) 
0.633*** 
(0.111) 
0.637*** 
(0.101) 
1.184*** 
(0.153) 
0.834*** 
(0.112) 
0.820*** 
(0.097) 
1.105*** 
(0.162) 
0.722*** 
(0.151) 
0.673*** 
(0.139) 
𝑅2 0.641 0.722 0.738 0.709 0.759 0.770  0.647 0.680 0.677 
𝑁 126,386 126,386 126,386 135,284 134,486 134,486 126,365 126,365 126,365 
      Note: see the first table in Appendix 5. 
Three-Dimensional Space Regressions (OLS) 
Weight matrix: WGR−Q WGR
4−Q WGR−GR
4−Q 
Estimated 
Coefficient (γ) 
1.318*** 
(0.165) 
0.798*** 
(0.132) 
0.777*** 
(0.119) 
R2 0.737 0.769 0.775 
N 126,365 126,365 126,365 
                                                        Note: see the first table in Appendix 5. 
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APPENDIX 7 
REGRESSIONS WITH DISTRICT CLUSTERING  
 
One-Dimensional Space Regressions (OLS)  
Weight matrix: 𝑾𝑵 
(naïve model) 
WG 
 
WR 
 
WQ 
 
WG
4
 
 
WR
4
 
 
WG−G
4
 WR−R
4
 
Estimated 
Coefficient (γ) 
0.996*** 
(0.063) 
1.050*** 
(0.057) 
0.910*** 
(0.076) 
0.949*** 
(0.085) 
0.829*** 
(0.033) 
0.338*** 
(0.055) 
0.798*** 
(0.035) 
0.310*** 
(0.050) 
R2 0.161 0.325 0.215 0.490 0.508 0.263 0.515 0.248 
N 135,309 135,308 126,386 135,284 135,308 126,386 135,308 126,386 
               Note: ***P<0.001; **p<0.01; *p<0.05. Clustered standard errors in parentheses; cluster: district 
Two-Dimensional Space Regressions (OLS)  
Weight matrix: 𝑾𝑮𝑹 𝑾𝑮𝑹
𝟒
 𝑾𝑮𝑹−𝑮𝑹
𝟒
 𝑾
𝑮−𝑸 𝑾𝑮
𝟒−𝑸 𝑾𝑮−𝑮
𝟒−𝑸 𝑾
𝑹−𝑸 𝑾𝑹
𝟒−𝑸 𝑾𝑹−𝑹
𝟒−𝑸 
Estimated Coefficient 
(γ) 
1.015*** 
(0.070) 
0.549*** 
(0.075) 
0.555*** 
(0.078) 
0.942*** 
(0.040) 
0.820*** 
(0.029) 
0.791*** 
(0.036) 
0.880*** 
(0.104) 
0.616*** 
(0.076) 
0.576*** 
(0.078) 
R2 0.290 0.512 0.544 0.675 0.740 0.755 0.581 0.610 0.604 
N 126,386 126,386 126,386 135,284 134,486 134,486 126,365 126,365 126,365 
       Note: see the first table in Appendix 6 
Three-Dimensional Space Regressions (OLS)  
Weight matrix 𝑾𝑮𝑹−𝑸 𝑾𝑮𝑹
𝟒−𝑸 𝑾𝑮𝑹−𝑮𝑹
𝟒−𝑸 
Estimated 
Coefficient (γ) 
0.968*** 
(0.060) 
0.766*** 
(0.025) 
0.757*** 
(0.036) 
R2 0.687 0.744 0.749 
N 126,365 126,365 126,365 
                                                         Note: see the first table in Appendix 6 
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APPENDIX 8 
LOCALIZED PRICE COMPETITION REGRESSIONS 
 
First-stage IV regressions 
Weight matrix: 𝑾𝑮
𝟒
 𝑾𝑮−𝑮
𝟒
 𝑾𝑮𝑹−𝑮𝑹
𝟒
 𝑾𝑮
𝟒−𝑸 𝑾𝑮−𝑮
𝟒−𝑸 𝑾𝑹−𝑹
𝟒−𝑸 𝑾𝑮𝑹
𝟒−𝑸 𝑾𝑮𝑹−𝑮𝑹
𝟒−𝑸 
Estimated 
Coefficient (𝜃) 
0.676*** 
(0.060) 
0.656*** 
(0.036) 
0.442*** 
(0.027) 
0.685*** 
(0.022) 
0.662*** 
(0.024) 
0.400*** 
(0.039) 
0.638***(0
.046) 
0.505*** 
(0.045) 
𝑅2 0.677 0.574 0.314 0.578 0.547 0.524 0.785 0.667 
𝑁 131,595 121,821 117,736 124,327 124,327 108,544 123,277 109,493 
                      Note: see the first table in Appendix 6. 
                    θ represents the estimated coefficient on the instrument 
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